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2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Between 2000 and 2008 Vladimir Putin presided over a dramatically changing Russia. 
During his tenure as President, the country enjoyed its strongest economic position since the end 
of Communism, characterized by booming average macroeconomic growth of 6.7 percent per 
year, modest inflation, budget surpluses, the eradication of foreign debt obligations and the 
accumulation of massive hard currency reserves (see Appendix A).
1
 Between 1999 and 2008 
Russia ranked among the world‘s fastest growing economies, also recording the highest per 
capita income in purchasing power parity terms ($16,000) among the promising BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China).
2
 Social order and stability returned after the fallout from the 1998 
financial crisis; unemployment levels fell, real disposable income and consumer spending rose, 
and many were lifted out of poverty. In comparison to the fractious experiments with democracy 
of the 1990s, the average Russian citizen viewed himself as safer, more secure, and living better 
across a series of indicators under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. 
Putin‘s rise also engendered the reemergence of autocratic rule and a gradual rollback of 
democracy. Centralization of political power at the federal level, enlargement of government 
resources, the marked absence of a true political opposition party, and an unprecedented 
intrusion of the state into economic affairs – all of these indicators attest to the Kremlin‘s zealous 
pursuit of control, which many commentators, both Western and Russian, believe cost Russia 
dearly in spite of the tremendous economic revival.  In terms of public safety, civil society, 
                                                 
1
 Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, ―The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin's Crackdown 
Holds Russia Back.‖  Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008.  
2
 Anders Aslund and Peter Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet. Peter G. Peterson Institute for International 
Economic and the Center for Strategic International Studies. 2009. P 40 
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3 
health, corruption, and the security of property rights, Russians were worse off in 2008 than they 
were a decade ago.
3
 
The ideal of a strong and sovereign Russia permeated government rhetoric and policy 
during this time. Wishing to chart his country‘s unique political, economic and social course 
through history independent of dictates from foreign influences, Putin took an assertive stance on 
the global stage. Clashes with the WTO and the IMF, a nationalist foreign policy, and other 
seemingly anti-globalization instances, however, occurred just as Russia was becoming 
increasingly integrated with the international economy. Between 1999 and 2008 the country‘s 
exports grew 525 percent and imports rose almost 640 percent; in the same period, foreign 
investment flows grew to $60 billion.
4
 Foreign direct investment constituted twelve percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008,
5
 reflecting overseas investors‘ substantial interest in 
profiting from Russia‘s flourishing economy. By no means could one consider Russia to be a 
full-fledged market economy in 2008: the existence of state monopolies combined with a corrupt 
state apparatus and the lack of sufficient institutional underpinnings to support the enforcement 
of private property rights left a huge array of market-sustaining reforms unachieved. Kremlin 
plans for modernization produced in the last eight years met with skepticism on the part of 
Russian citizens and Western observers, who doubted the credibility of the state‘s commitment 
to facilitating economic competition via a strong rule of law and transparent policy environment. 
Wholesale adoption of Western capitalism has not occurred in Russia; instead, between 2000 and 
2008 foreign financial intermediation occurred within a state-dominated economic system. 
                                                 
3
 Ibid 
4
 William Cooper, ―Russia‘s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States.‖ 
Congressional Research Service. Report for Congress, RL 34512.  
5
 Ibid 
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Beginning with a severe decline in the Russian stock market in August 2008 and 
compounded by plummeting oil prices, the global financial crisis has initiated severe economic 
recession in Russia. As a result, myriad weaknesses in various aspects of its export-dependent 
economy, money markets and financial sector have been laid bare; gross domestic product fell 
9.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009,
6
 real incomes plunged 6.7 percent,
7
 and foreign exchange 
reserves shrank by $131 billion in 2008.
8
 Initially adamant about Russia‘s strength and ability to 
withstand adverse economic impacts seen as originating in Western nations, the Kremlin 
reversed course in August 2009 when President Dmitry Medvedev admitted that misguided 
government policies had exacerbated his country‘s problems: ―We cannot develop any longer 
like this….the crisis has put us under such conditions that we will have to take decisions about 
changing the structure of our economy,‖
9
 he acknowledged. This statement alone indicates a 
substantial break with nearly a decade of Putin-led assertions insisting on Russia‘s independent 
success in generating wealth in the global economy. The severity of the present downturn brings 
questions pertaining to state interference in economic affairs and diversification of the resource-
dependent economy to the forefront of public and scholarly discourse. Yet, as renowned Russia 
scholar Dmitri Simes notes, ―in Russia, hard times normally produce hard lines;‖
10
 future liberal 
reforms are by no means the expectation. In fact, the crisis may cause any burgeoning interest in 
such policies on the part of the government to be replaced by hardening of state control in the 
economic sphere. 
                                                 
6
 ―Russia and the Financial Crisis.‖ The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) Russia. June 15, 
2009.  
7
 Ibid 
8
 Ibid 
9
 Stuart Williams, ―Russian economy hitting dead end.‖ The Associated Foreign Press. August 11, 2009.  
10
 Dmitri Simes, ―Uncertainty in Moscow.‖ The National Interest Online: Subjective Evaluation. December 12, 
2008.  
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Russia now unmistakably confronts the tradeoffs implied by the realities of 
unprecedented interdependence with the global economy. The economic devastation the country 
experienced in 1998 as a result of its first financial crisis followed several years of attempts at 
market-oriented reform strategies and interaction with the global economy. Instead of 
transforming the inefficient legacies of the Soviet economy into a modern competitive market, 
this so-called ―neoliberal experiment‖
11
 resulted in narrowly focused policies that exposed 
Russia to international capital volatility and led to a collapse of the ruble. Yet today Russian 
policymakers face a vastly different political and economic situation than their counterparts who 
were forced to devalue the ruble and default on foreign obligations a decade ago. Since 1999 
heightened exposure to foreign capital flows has occurred concurrently with the Putin-led 
channeling of windfall profits from commodities exports to a state-controlled network of 
domestic enterprise comprising banks, holding companies, and industrial leaders. During the oil 
boom of 2000-2008, this arrangement ensured economic and social stability, a hallmark of the 
Putin regime, but hinged precariously on favorable externally determined commodities prices 
and operated via a deficient and weak domestic mechanism. The implosion of the Western 
financial system in 2008 stopped the capital flows that had sustained this system. The resultant 
diminished financial capacity of the Russian state and indirect consequences for domestic 
politics affect the viability and attractiveness of available policies for recovery and future 
growth, elevating the urgency of determining how the Kremlin will attempt to balance 
preservation of its strong influence on the Russian economy and society with increased 
adherence to policies and conditions favorable to stability and security in internationally 
integrated goods and capital markets.  
                                                 
11
 Neil Robinson, ―The global economy, reform and crisis in Russia.‖ Review of International Political Economy 6:4 
Winter 1999. Pages 531-564 
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    The formulation of a response to the crisis reflects the shifting balance between 
considerations of domestic policy goals and the constraints the powerful forces of globalization 
potentially impose on the Kremlin if it wishes to reap the benefits of international markets. The 
experience of the current crisis opens wider the door of opportunity to break Russia‘s historical 
legacy of an authoritarian state maintaining a resource-dependent economy; it may force far-
reaching changes in the economy, society, and foreign policy. Furthermore, it offers a case study 
of how developing countries respond to the ―trilemma‖
12
 confronting nation-states in the post-
global crisis world: what is the price of deeper international economic integration in terms of 
foregone flexibility of the nation-state to prescribe policies driven by domestically-determined 
needs? Conclusions about Russia‘s shifting priorities and options carry implications for 
undemocratic regimes that rely on the global system for market-based financial intermediation, 
as well as for the prospects for international cooperation and leadership in the evolving global 
order. By tracing the interaction of external economic events and Russia‘s domestic economic 
framework this thesis will characterize the changing considerations and constraints presently 
faced by policymakers and the impact of such a shifting economic decision making climate on 
domestic regime stability. The financial crisis has forced significant reconfigurations in 
economic thinking within the Russian government, but the overall approach to economic 
diversification, modernization and liberalization will likely remain largely unchanged if Putin 
and those in his inner circle feel they retain a secure hold on political power.    
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since August 2008, the adverse impact of the global credit crisis on the Russian economy 
has precipitated a flurry of commentary, analysis and questions regarding the government policy 
                                                 
12
 Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 2007. 
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7 
response and prospects for long-term structural economic reform. In several cases, this 
scholarship has connected the current situation to broader political, economic and social issues 
both internal and external to Russia, creating a substantial body of observation and perspectives 
on which this thesis will draw.  
Russia‘s increased interaction with global markets since encountering its first financial 
crisis in 1998 has created different conditions under which future policy will take shape; 
previous frameworks assessing factors influencing the sequence, timing and viability of 
economic liberalization in Russia must be tailored to fit the particular environment created by the 
recent global downturn. Theoretical perspectives on the opportunities and limitations inherent to 
the contemporary globalized economy offer basic frameworks for understanding the Russian 
manifestation of crisis and response. 
 
Globalization theory  
Theories of the impact of globalization, defined as increased international economic 
integration, generally agree on the existence of a tradeoff between benefits to domestic economic 
growth and limitations on government ability to pursue domestic policy goals that may be at 
odds with what is favorable for international economic activity. Dani Rodrik refers to a 
―trilemma‖
13
 confronting nation states, limiting them to the successful attainment of two out of 
three policy goals: independent monetary policy in pursuit of low unemployment and inflation 
levels, capital mobility, and a fixed exchange rate. Similarly, Thomas Friedman cites the 
necessity for today‘s nation-state to don the ―golden straitjacket‖
14
 of privatizing enterprises, 
balancing budgets, lowering tariffs, removing restrictions on foreign investment, and eliminating 
                                                 
13
 Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes. 
14
 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York, NY. Anchor Books, 1999. P 110.  
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8 
subsidies for state-owned firms if it wishes to attract international investors and profit from 
globalization.
15
  
If the paths to economic prosperity available to states in the contemporary global 
economy are thus increasingly dictated by external actors, at least in some policy spheres, the 
sovereignty of the state itself, and political power bases, may be at threat. Rodrik argues that the 
weakened ability of national governments to sustain domestic social welfare arrangements in 
light of externally motivated obligations could prove politically destabilizing. The scaling back 
of Icelandic government expenditures on social welfare in order to repay external debt 
obligations and stabilize the krona serves as contemporary evidence of this dynamic. Citizens 
may increasingly criticize governments whose policies towards international markets they view 
as inadequate in ensuring social stability, prosperity, or other traditional mandates bestowed on 
the nation-state. Contrary to the suggestions of contemporary rhetoric, Garrett believes that 
global markets impose weaker constraints on national policy choices than presumed due to the 
―strengthened political incentives for governments to use the policy instruments of the state to 
mitigate market dislocations by redistributing wealth and risk.‖
16
 Thus, the creation by 
government of new agencies for the purpose of retraining workers or disbursing social security 
funds itself supports the notion that the state retains capacity to effect change aimed at 
counteracting the effects of globalization. Garrett argues that states have the tools to slow 
international economic integration; the degree to which they are used in this regard is a reflection 
of social and political factors.    
                                                 
15
 Qtd in Barry Eichengreen, ―One Economy, Ready or Not: Thomas Friedman‘s Jaunt Through Globalization.‖ 
Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999.  
16
 Geoffrey Garrett, ―Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?‖ International 
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of 
World Politics (Autumn, 1998), pp. 787-824 
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9 
Integration with the global economy offers the potentially significant benefits to 
economic growth rates, but forces countries to bear risks that, if not addressed via properly 
tailored economic policy, may destabilize and bankrupt nations. Foreign direct investment and 
capital inflows, two indicators of international economic integration, have been shown to 
stimulate growth in developing countries such as Russia. Nevertheless, the lack of strong 
domestic institutions and regulatory frameworks, particularly in the banking sector, allowed 
waves of financial crisis to destabilize these regions in the 1990s.
17
 International institutions and 
scholars advised developing country governments to increase economic cooperation with other 
countries, modernize the domestic financial sector and encourage transparency, competition, 
accountability, and protection of property rights; however, perceptions of globalization, political 
and other factors influence the timing and content of such reforms, and ultimately, their success 
in achieving lasting economic development. Specifically, governments in post-crisis emerging 
economies must balance expenditures on social welfare and pursuit of structural reforms 
increasing the state‘s propensity to profit in a globalized economy. Rogoff and others, in 
discussing how to best create a suitable domestic political and economic milieu for harnessing 
the benefits of global markets at minimal risk, suggest that insulation from the global economy 
through capital controls may have been a more promising strategy than complete openness to 
financial markets for economic growth post-2008.
18
 Only developing countries with ―stable 
macroeconomic policies as well as sufficiently strong financial and other institutions, regulation 
and governance…could benefit from being financially open;‖
19
 the divergent impact of the 2008 
crisis on significantly ―open‖ and relatively ―closed‖ economies has prompted a reinvigorated 
                                                 
17
 Ibid 
18
 M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff and Shang-Jin Wei. ―Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal.‖ 
August 2006. IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 56(1), P 8-62 
19
 Ibid 
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10 
research agenda on the components of a stable and prosperous interaction with foreign 
economies under increasing financial globalization. Scholars of Russian politics often cite the 
early 1990s as a period when Russia, under the heavy-handed influence of the West, 
unsuccessfully pursued the paradigm of globalization‘s positive promises.
20
 With this historical 
background in mind, economic development strategy today must harmonize Russia‘s unique 
values, traditions and resources with the norms and processes of the global environment.  
 
Comparison with 1998 financial crisis 
In recent Russian history, crisis preceded periods of substantial economic change in 
1991-1993 and 1998-2002.
21
 Thus, in an attempt to describe the impact of the 2008 credit crunch 
on Russia, scholars have examined what its differences in nature and context from the 1998 
financial crisis may imply for the future. Whereas 1998 involved a national public sector and 
currency crisis, excessive borrowing by the private sector due to major triple shocks—terms of 
trade, capital outflows, and tight external borrowing – incited the crisis of 2008.
22
 As Bogetic 
notes, global linkages in place by 2008 meant that the drastic deterioration of the foreign market 
situation with respect to raw material prices and financial markets made a Russian economic 
downturn inevitable.
23
 Most notably, the 2008 crisis has spread to the real sector of the economy 
(i.e. the downturn is evident in wages and industrial production), adding broader uncertainty over 
macroeconomic growth to problems in the financial sector. Consequently, academic literature 
has broadly segmented potential government responses to the 2008 crisis into short-term 
                                                 
20
 Paul Saunders, ―Why ‗Globalization‘ Didn‘t Rescue Russia.‖ Policy Review, Hoover Institution, Stanford 
University. February & March 2001.  
21
 ―Russia‘s Road Back.‖ Interview with Anders Aslund. Peterson Institute for International Economics. April 22, 
2009.   
22
 Zeljko Bogetic, “Russia: Recent Economic Developments and Medium-Term Prospects.‖ March 31, 2008. 
Moscow. 
23
 Ibid 
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11 
recovery measures and longer-term structural reforms aimed at diversifying the economy and 
furthering economic liberalization by reducing state control over economic activity.  
It is important to note that a weak government ruled Russia in the post-1998 period.
24
 
Some structural reforms were introduced during this time, but were eclipsed by the 
reestablishment of state control over key sectors of the economy beginning in 2002.
25
 According 
to Neil Robinson, between 1999 and 2003 the Russian state emphasized the use of energy 
revenues as a source of patronage instead of strengthening state administrative capacity, a legal 
basis for economic activity and the rule of law; as a result, the state could not stimulate 
homegrown finance and growth, nor harness the ―transformative powers of global markets.‖
26
  
Scholars agree that the Russian economic development policy depended on revenues from oil 
and gas exports in the 2000s, encouraged by high commodity prices. This created vulnerability to 
international downturns while limiting the scope for institutional and regulatory reforms that 
could free the country from the structural legacy of communism. Today, the strength of the 
―more sophisticated‖
27
 Russian state is strikingly higher and its reach decidedly broader, 
although it is precisely the 2008 crisis that may serve as the critical juncture initiating a descent 
from this apex of potency. 
In contrast to the inability of the Russian state to control widespread social disturbances 
accompanying the 1998 fall-out, particularly the upheaval of the ―balance‖ established among 
oligarchs and the public distress caused by economic depression, the Kremlin has succeeded in 
preserving social stability since the start of the 2008 crisis. In assessing the significance of 
popular opinion and activity for periods of crisis, Volkov and others emphasize the absence of a 
                                                 
24
 Vladimir Mau, ―The Global Crisis As Seen from Russia.‖ Russia in Global Affairs¸vol. 1, January – March 2009.  
25
 William Cooper, ―Russia‘s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States.‖  
26
 Neil Robinson, ―The global economy, reform and crisis in Russia.‖ 
27
 Andew Wilson, ―Russia‘s economic crisis – no cue for ‗Perestroika 2.0.‘‖ openDemorcracy Online. September 4, 
2009.  
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12 
tradition of mass democratic protest inciting a shift in the power balance of the Russian ruling 
elite, attributing this to the ―famous passivity‖
28
 of the Russian people that is often described as 
the flip-side of ―an unrivalled ability to survive adversity.‖
29
 Today, some argue, unlimited 
powers, especially in the realm of media, and sufficient financial resources allow the Kremlin to 
exploit this dynamic and mitigate instances of social unrest much more swiftly and effectively 
than a decade ago.
30
 Acknowledging that the Kremlin‘s approach has so far not significantly 
resulted in societal upheaval, Aslund and Kuchins believe that the government has poorly 
managed the crisis by ignoring its root causes.
31
 In their view, such a policy will yield results that 
are ―politically and socially untenable.‖
32
 Perhaps, then, the time horizon for mobilization of 
notable societal opposition is much longer than the average length of economic crisis.   
 
Putin’s economic policy and the social contract 
Literature related to the 2008 financial crisis devotes substantial attention to the economic 
development agenda during Putin‘s presidency (2000 – 2008). Examination of the economic 
preferences of Putin and his closest government advisors has been inextricably linked to 
discussions pertaining to his conceptions of state power, state-society relations, democratic 
freedom, and other notions.  Understanding the formulation of Putin‘s brand of leadership has 
fuelled scholarly debate, with the only point of agreement among top academics and researchers 
being the conclusion that the Russian state is an enigma. Though scholars and pundits disagree 
                                                 
28
 Vadim Volkov, ―Will the Financial Crisis Lead to Political Change in Russia?‖ PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 
No. 81. Eurasian Strategy Project, Walsh School of Foreign Service, September 2009.  
29
 Ibid 
30
 Ibid 
31
 The Russia Balance Sheet p 55 
32
 Ibid 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
13 
about the degree and sustainability of Putin‘s monopoly on Russian political resources, he 
undoubtedly carries substantial weight in economic policymaking today.  
Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes believe President Putin held financial stability and 
independence of his country as his primary objectives, which he achieved and sustained through 
rapid accumulation of money into the oil-stabilization fund and into foreign exchange reserves.
33
 
Broadly speaking, they believe four ideological principles guide the Putin administration‘s 
economic agenda: 1) the economy is Russia‘s key strength in the world; 2) the economy should 
be as strong and as efficient as possible; 3) the economy should ensure the priority of the state; 4) 
the economy must be robust to crisis.
34
 Most of these objectives are often described as stemming 
from ―never again‖ lessons learned after the 1998 crisis; different interpretations of this link 
highlight Putin‘s personal desire never to again allow Russia to suffer from humiliation on the 
international stage, and the belief that pursuit of these objectives constitutes the basis for Putin‘s 
domestic popular and political support. 
Based on this framework, Gaddy and Ickes posit that Putin relied on the global system to 
intermediate the financial flows from Russia‘s own oil and gas export earnings into the domestic 
corporate sector, simultaneously providing state wealth and affording control over domestic 
private enterprise through a ―protection racket.‖
35
  The owners of Russia‘s most powerful 
companies (oligarchs) were allowed to conduct business free from government appropriation as 
long as they did not oppose Putin‘s tax regime, whose primary function was to channel more 
resources to the federal government.
36
 This mechanism operated via the deficient financial 
sector, which had shifted from financing government deficits in the 1990s to expanding lending 
                                                 
33
 Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, ―Putin's Third Way.‖ The National Interest. January 21, 2009. 
34
 Ibid 
35
 Ibid 
36
 Ibid 
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to households and corporations in the Putin years,
37
 and therefore hinged heavily on international 
economic developments. Gaddy and Ickes posit that Putin will seek to maintain financial 
sovereignty, that is, autonomy from foreign influence in economic decision making, at all 
costs.
38
 Steven Halliwell, like many others, points out that the crisis threatens Putin‘s ―grand 
bargain‖ with Russian society – the exchange of basic freedoms for economic stability.
39
 
 
Domestic politics 
 The present domestic political arrangement serves as both a determinant of policy 
response to the crisis and a variable shaped by the economic implications of the crisis itself. 
Mobilization of the political will for reform, a matter of political leadership influenced by its 
ability to sustain economic growth, is frequently cited as the key factor in the implementation of 
reforms.
40
 The preoccupation of the world‘s preeminent scholars of Russian politics with the 
tandem of power at the federal level has raised a number of questions in the wake of the crisis. 
President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin and their respective inner circles hold 
allegiance to different groups and espouse differing conceptions of Russia‘s economic 
development. Sestanovich and others suggest that the presence of ―liberal reformers‖ in the 
Russian administration may shape the reform agenda, highlighting Medvedev‘s emphasis on the 
importance of further reform and on cooperation with other countries. Have the policies of 
Putin‘s clan been discredited, creating the potential for more liberal economic policymaking? 
Would Putin seek to take ownership of such measures, or step back and permit Medvedev to 
                                                 
37
 Eric Berglof and A. Lehmann, ―Sustaining Russia‘s Growth: The Role of Financial Reform,‖ Journal of 
Comparative Economics, Volume 37, Issue 2, June 2009, P 198-206.  
38
 Ibid 
39
 Steven Halliwell, ―Russia and the Global Crisis: Consequences of Delayed Reform.‖ Strategic Asia 2009–10: 
Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical Stability. National Bureau of Asian Research: 2009.  
40
 Anders Aslund and Andrew Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet.  
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15 
assume a leading role? To what extent is Medvedev more liberal than Putin, and would economic 
policy under his rule differ dramatically from that of the past eight years? Although these are 
undeniably interesting areas of inquiry, especially in light of Putin‘s indications that he will seek 
a return to the presidency in 2012, this thesis will primary focus on the observable impacts of the 
2008 crisis on policy choices available to the Russian government to argue that it has shifted the 
composition of economic policymaking to allow for new or altered considerations regarding the 
global economy and its relationship to the Russian economic condition. Awareness that the crisis 
likely contributes to the evolution of fundamental aspects of Russian politics will contribute to a 
nuanced analysis of its effects on viable policy choices.        
Noting that elites and special interests would suffer from the economic reforms necessary 
for Russia to overcome the recession, Hough analyzes potential responses through the lens of 
incentives generated by potential economic reform. According to Robinson, short-term political 
gain, buying off lobbies, and the protection of vested economic interests constituted government 
objectives that hindered reform in the wake of the 1998 crash. Greene argues that evidence of 
this dynamic in response to the 2008 crisis already exists: the government has tacitly allowed 
various private and public sector interests to gain control of companies, including Aeroflot and 
large banks, in order to satisfy the ruling elite.
41
  
 
Scenarios for the future course of economic policy 
            Recent literature attempts to predict the future course of economic policy and the 
development agenda by employing event-driven scenario frameworks differing across the factors 
influencing the sequence and extent of reform. Erik Berglof and Alexander Lehmann focus on 
the overall macroeconomic position as a driver of economic liberalization; in their view, ―the 
                                                 
41
 Sam Greene, ―Domesticating Russia‘s Economic Crisis.‖ International Economic Bulletin, June 2009.  
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prospect of several years of weak if not negative economic growth will likely weaken popular 
support for further economic reforms‖ since rising inflation and a slowdown in credit expansion 
may command the Kremlin‘s attention.
42
 Nicolay Petrov predicts that authoritarianism, not 
economic liberalization, will rise in the near future, as the government does not yet appreciate 
the seriousness of crisis impacts but will revert to traditional methods of control in attempt to 
preserve political power. This prediction is consistent with the findings of Pitilk that ―an 
institutionalized system of conflict management in constitutional democracies‖
43
 provides a 
higher likelihood of successful responsive policy changes than does an authoritarian state like 
Russia. Another perspective, led by Anders Aslund, posits three scenarios for the future: a) a 
continuation of the Putin approach: low growth rate, living on energy resources, and maintaining 
hard authoritarianism; b) a liberalization both of economics and politics, and opening up to the 
West, the world, and increased globalization, and c) a serious crisis scenario.
44
 Putin‘s desire to 
prevent the third scenario prompted him to let the more plausible policies recommended by 
government liberals proceed; this is the driver of policy shifts. Similarly, Halliwell presents three 
varying scenarios for duration of global recession and outlines policy implications on this basis.
45
 
 
Scope for further research 
As the country stands at a crossroads in the economic sphere, several facets of the 2008 
crash impact on Russia have not yet been adequately addressed by existing literature. The global 
nature of the crisis will certainly continue to have domestic implications. Medvedev and Putin 
must work to facilitate recovery and cultivate a business-friendly, institutionally-sound 
                                                 
42
 Eric Berglof, ―Sustaining Russia‘s Growth.‖ 
43
 Hans Pitlik and S. Wirth, ―Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization?: an empirical test.‖ European 
Journal of Political Economy, Volume 19, Issue 3, September 2003, P 565-581. 
44
 ―Russia‘s Road Back.‖ Interview with Anders Aslund. 
45
 Halliwell, ―Russia and the Global Crisis.‖ 
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environment in the long run; the policies available can cater to both domestic and international 
constituencies, and the tradeoffs in seeking such a balance have yet to be studied in depth. 
Increased social welfare and heightened international credibility might be obtainable in tandem, 
not necessarily at one another‘s expense. Additionally, while the relatively small body of 
literature pertaining to the recent crisis in Russia addresses political implications for Putin‘s 
regime, there has been little work suggesting how such concerns will percolate through 
policymaking channels into economic measures.  
The unprecedented global scale of recession associated with this crisis offers the 
possibility of exploring how shared negative experiences shape policy responses. To what extent 
will considerations about cooperation for international economic recovery, for example, 
coordination of central bank policies and limits on protectionism, factor into Russian policy 
options? There is mixed evidence on whether banking crises encourage reforms in developing 
countries; how do predictions change based on the presence of macroeconomic risk stemming 
from global recession, length of recession, and impact on certain sectors of the real economy? 
Important conclusions for other emerging markets or authoritarian states may be drawn from the 
Russian experience thus far as to what constitutes a desirable balance between economic policies 
promoting stability and those promoting international openness and efficiency. Finally, it will be 
important to evaluate the broader implications of various economic reform scenarios for Russia‘s 
foreign policy, and for the world economy.  
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METHODOLOGY 
In analyzing the effects of the 2008 global credit crisis on the Russian government policy 
response, it is essential to first characterize the economic and political landscape prior to the 
downturn, to identify key features of policymaking in this environment, and to understand the 
channels through which external forces altered Russia‘s economy before and during the crisis 
itself. The research question fundamentally pertains to tradeoffs facing policymakers seeking to 
sustain economic growth: between adaptation and control, broadly speaking, and in particular 
between the importance of considering the economic implications of external forces in 
policymaking and responding to internally-driven policy needs. This, in turn, could imply 
―tighter control over the economy, more constraints on the big businesses and less impetus 
toward integration into the global economy‖
46
 on one hand, or a greater inclination to participate 
openly in the global marketplace and relax state controls.  
Scholars largely agree on the basic characteristics of the balance determined during 
Vladimir Putin‘s tenure as President (2000-2008): in order to restore Russia‘s status as a strong 
and sovereign nation and, by extension, to sustain political power, Putin believed in the necessity 
of accumulating wealth for the country. This ensured social stability characterized by a fairly 
consistent price level, job security, and other features that translated into a population largely 
uncritical of the government.
47
 The desire to promote social stability came as a result of the 
disastrous societal effects of the 1998 financial crisis, which left Russian citizens critical of the 
government and fuelled years of short-lived and unstable governments. To Putin, this suggested 
that a wealthy state could provide for its citizens in dire circumstances and withstand crisis with 
a higher likelihood, ensuring political continuity and power. Thus, the pursuit of such ―financial 
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sovereignty‖
48
 conditioned Putin‘s choice of economic policy. The state maintained tight control 
over domestic private enterprise, and employed the Russian financial sector to intermediate 
profits from commodities exports into state reserves. Scholars refer to the acceptance of this 
economic arrangement in return for domestic price stability and employment levels as the 
implicit ―social contract.‖
49
 
The Putin economic development agenda hinged on international economic activity in a 
particular manner: oil prices determined government revenues, and, accordingly, the state 
budget. In its approach, the Kremlin believed the internal system it constructed could control and 
direct external flows to enrich the nation. The young body of scholarship pertaining to the effects 
of the recent crisis on Russia‘s economy demonstrates the severity of impacts on multiple 
dimensions; this analysis seeks to strengthen the understanding of how these effects translate into 
recovery measures and contribute to the formulation of long-term economic development 
strategy. In doing so, it will contribute to the study of how economic crises encourage (or 
discourage) economic reform and how easily governments may align domestic goals to 
productively and reliably sustain growth and promote wealth under present levels of 
globalization. 
Essentially, I argue that the effects of the 2008 crisis have caused the Russian 
government, led by Putin, who remains the chief policymaker, to put forth policies and take 
actions that would not have been pursued in the absence of such a cataclysmic event. It is 
precisely the newest expression of risk originating abroad that drives this shifting mindset. There 
was little incentive to deviate from the economic structures put in place by Putin before the 
crisis; despite allowing for swift and appropriate actions in the immediate post-crisis period, the 
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system failed to protect fully against a downturn and limited financial capacity of the state. The 
Kremlin now looks for cues regarding global recovery as it formulates economic policy for 
recovery and long-term growth. Struggling to balance preservation of political power, financial 
sovereignty, and social stability, it has begun to formulate an economic policy that demonstrates 
the tradeoffs between policies favoring domestic priorities and those conducive to stability in an 
internationally integrated economy. To be sure, Putin and Medvedev aim to project confidence in 
Russia‘s propensity to navigate the economic storm in pursuit of sustaining the social contract 
and maintaining similar domestic objectives as before. Individual preferences of government 
officials, social unrest, and other factors may explain the state‘s recovery policies. Yet the 
features of the crisis response that have already emerged suggest a mounting appreciation for the 
inevitable need for policies to respond to the present vulnerability of the Russian system to 
external forces. Given the difficulty of predicting the path of global recovery, the analysis will 
refer to three exogenously determined scenarios with varying levels of energy prices and length 
of recession in the rest of the world: 1) long and deep global recession and energy prices sink 
near historic lows; 2) brief recession and strong rebound of energy prices; 3) moderate recovery, 
and energy prices stay at historically elevated levels. Though the hypothesis posits that the 
Russian state now formulates policy to a greater degree by attempting to discern which of these 
scenarios will occur, the tempered growth forecasts at the end of December 2008 renders it likely 
that a quick recovery has been ruled out. A scenario between 1) and 3), that is, moderate 
recovery and gradual rebound of oil prices (though not to previously record high levels) now 
seems to be the most likely.  
 Process tracing allows the most effective illumination of the links between globalization, 
defined as international economic integration, the 2008 financial crisis, and economic strategy 
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formulation. First, it is necessary to determine the pillars of Putin‘s economic policy during the 
boom years, as well as what particular structures characterized Russian integration into the 
global financial economy since 1998. Policies on economic growth, inflation, the ruble exchange 
rate, state budgetary plans, the evolution of the financial sector, foreign direct investment, capital 
flows and state ownership of assets will be examined. Based on this initial scenario, it will 
become possible to envision a picture of what reform would entail and construct a counterfactual 
understanding of what Russia‘s trajectory could have been had the financial crisis not occurred. 
WTO accession, the introduction of transparent procurement processes for major investments, 
and a halt or reversal in nationalization projects are all examples of positive orientation towards 
global economic integration, as they demonstrate willingness to adhere to international norms of 
transparency, competition and unobstructed flows of goods and capital across borders. The 
relative weight of alternate explanatory factors, including personal preferences of leaders and 
societal demands, will be gauged by exploring whether they may be causally linked to significant 
policy decisions. To the extent reliable information is available through Western media, I will 
identify ―core interests‖ for individuals and government agencies participating in economic 
policymaking between 2000 and 2008; these may comprise specific policy preferences, broader 
ideological tendencies, or considerations about political power or social standing of tangential 
relation to formulation of preferences for economic policy. This section of the analysis will be 
limited by the restricted ability of Western media provide a thorough description of the actions 
and perspectives of these actors as a result of limitations to access imposed by the Russian state. 
As there are a multitude of approaches to describing personal preferences of Russian 
policymakers, I will consult the top scholars of Russian politics to sketch the basic contours of 
individual motivations and tendencies; for a data point in which a given actor is significant, I will 
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consult the relevant core preference to examine whether the action taken showed consistency 
with this preference. If it did not, I will examine other independent variables. If it did, which I 
expect to be the case in the majority of instances, a more nuanced analysis of the degree of 
continuity between preferences and actions taken will be required.   
Scholarly consensus on the preferences of Russian citizens will determine the basis for 
societal demands, an alternate explanatory factor for the economic policy chosen by the Russian 
government thus far. Based on public opinion survey data from the period 2000 – 2008 
indicating satisfaction with economic indicators such as wages, employment levels and prices, I 
will identify the chief areas of concern for the Russian public. Given Russia‘s authoritarian 
tradition, I expect to find that societal demands carry relatively less weight in policymaking, as 
they are seldom articulated aggressively and pointedly enough to significantly steer leaders 
against their personal preferences. In the particular case of my research question, I expect that in 
the short-term, societal demands have prompted the Russian government to formulate recovery 
measures addressing first and foremost these needs. The tension lies between popular demands, 
that is, democracy, and the interests of individual leaders – autocracy. Importantly, the financial 
crisis and the external factors it injects into policymaking affects both these actors and, by 
extension, their preferences for future economic policy.  
The 2008 financial crisis may be viewed as a ―critical juncture‖
50
 in Russian economic 
policymaking, inviting the possibility of a dramatic shift in the direction of the nation‘s long-
term economic development. Four major shocks transmitted the global crisis in Russia: 
 
1) The intensification of the global crisis caused a sudden stop and then a reversal in capital 
flows out of Russia. 
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2) The global credit crunch and tightening external borrowing conditions exacerbated 
liquidity problems in Russia‘s banking system. 
  
3) A sharp drop in the price of oil began to erode Russia‘s fiscal and external account 
surpluses and its huge international currency reserves.  
 
4) Russia‘s stock market experienced a massive decline––largely reflecting the global loss 
of confidence and the precipitous drop in the price of oil.
51
 
 
Using process tracing, the analysis will explain how the external factors listed above affected the 
Russian economy, for example, reducing the balance sheets in three sectors (government, 
corporations and households). The first causal mechanism will thus be established between the 
externally determined variables (e.g. commodities prices, capital inflows), the choice of domestic 
institutions and policies, and resulting economic circumstances. The actions of the Kremlin since 
August 2008 in response to the specific externally-driven economic circumstances identified will 
subsequently be compared to pre-crisis policies and linked back to externally driven occurrences 
by rigorous and systematic reconstruction of each step of the decision-making process;
52
 this will 
form the second causal mechanism. Government decisions pertaining to exchange rate dynamics, 
stimulus spending, lending to corporations and other entities, and messages regarding the crisis 
and recovery measures offer unique data points which may have occurred following precise 
events in the global economy impacting particular aspects of the Russian economy.  
It is important to note that both a tightening of state control and a more global orientation 
are compatible with a state more acutely aware of its economy‘s exposure to external shocks. If 
the Kremlin did not respond to exogenous incidents that negatively impacted its pre-crisis 
economic agenda, such as reductions in stabilization fund reserves, the argument that policy is 
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becoming increasingly responsive to global events is undermined. As Capoccia and Kelemen 
note, counterfactual analysis of the plausible consequences of other, viable choices that were not 
taken is necessary for a deeper understanding of the driving forces.
53
 Data pertaining to 
government discussions and policies ultimately not chosen may be difficult to access and limited 
due to the still-evolving nature of the crisis response; furthermore, the government censors 
Russian media coverage of the crisis and has begun conducting discussions regarding economic 
policy in closed sessions.  Limited access to reliable sources of information, however, will not 
detract from the power of the causal linkages outlined in this section to provide a deep 
understanding of the key decisions made thus far and their immediate context.
54
 
To explore whether the Kremlin is in fact responding to alternative independent variables 
more so than to external forces, episodes of social unrest, like the January 2009 protests in 
Vladivostok, will be similarly examined in search of connected policy responses. Russia has a 
number of ―company-towns‖ whose livelihood depends largely on industrial production in 
factories of one or a few large enterprises. Federal policies and actions towards theses regions 
have received much attention during the crisis, as these areas, which were adversely affected by 
the crisis, are viewed as potential hot spots for social unrest. Social stability is itself a variable 
affected by the economic crisis, as it has led to declining incomes and employment and abrupt 
reductions in social services.
55
 Here the analysis will proceed from data points of social 
instability, identified primarily through reputable media outlets, to government responses. 
Policies determined as responding primarily to domestic constituencies may or may not be in line 
with those ―advocated‖ by the global economy, that is, those policies that the first stage of 
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analysis will identify as components of a globally-oriented reform agenda. To separate the 
influence of the economic crisis from the variable of social stability, I will assess government 
economic policy responses to episodes of social unrest unconnected with the global factors of the 
present downturn. There may be instances when the government has acted preemptively or 
responded in a manner uncharacteristic of its prior relationship with society, indicating a shift in 
the approach to this relationship. Most instances of social unrest occurring after August 2008 
will likely be linked indirectly to the external effects of the financial crisis, though some episodes 
may be decoupled from a direct relationship.  
Additionally, no analysis of decision-making within the Russian state can ignore the 
complex interplay among Kremlin factions and individuals in power. Though financial policy is 
not a traditional responsibility of the Russian president, in October 2008 Medvedev created a 
―Council for the Development of the Financial Markets of the Russian Federation under the 
auspices of the President of the Russian Federation‖ which assigned his administration several 
responsibilities in this domain.
56
 Later, he criticized the government, though not Putin directly, 
for a slow crisis response.
57
 President Dmitri Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, 
Medvedev‘s Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and 
others harbor individual political ambitions, and so-called ―liberal reformers‖
58
 in the Medvedev 
and Putin administrations in the post-crisis period also exert influence on economic 
policymaking; however, this thesis will proceed from the assumption that the liberal clan 
advocating economic liberalization and market-promoting structural reforms held a much smaller 
share of economic decision making up to 2008. The degree of this influence varies, however, 
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with the relative importance Putin assigns to the economic policy recommendations of this 
group. I will seek anecdotal evidence from news articles, interviews and secondary sources to 
assess the implications shifting balances of power have on the economic agenda. If Putin will 
seek to maintain the existing political equilibrium, domestic politics suggest he should continue 
to suppress liberal challengers. Support for these individuals and their policies may prove 
politically destabilizing and hence undesirable. However, if my argument is correct, the Putin 
economic plan will prove unsustainable in the future due to the vulnerability it creates for the 
Russian economy. It would be irrational to assume that Russian officials are completely blind to 
this idea; therefore, the process of economic policymaking occurring today is closely linked with 
Putin‘s reformulation of a strategy to ensure his political survival. How different the resulting 
policies and economic landscape will be remains to be seen.  
While outside the particular lens through which this thesis approaches the government 
response to the Russian financial crisis, my hypothesis assumes that given Russia‘s authoritarian 
decision-making regime and lack of historical precedence for democratic political activism, a 
turn towards or away from globalization will be marginally influenced by popular demand for 
change, especially in the long term. Traditionally, the Russian population has harbored a high 
threshold for authoritarianism,
59
 seemingly preferring societal stability to disruption caused by 
democratic opposition. This supposition justifies the focus on government responses to the 2008 
crisis. On this dimension, a critical comparison of recent social unrest with responses to instances 
of social disruption following the 1998 crisis will be especially illuminating. Thus far, the 
accumulated financial resources have allowed the government to stem potential points of popular 
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discontent; for instance, $1 billion was pledged to support the ailing automobile industry
60
 and 
four regional governors removed on the basis of their alleged failure to fight the crisis.
61
 Whereas 
after 1998 the government lacked the political and fiscal resources to mitigate detriment to 
society, leading to the introduction of a series of economic reforms, the strengthened capacity of 
the state today allows it to act more effectively towards this end. I will attempt to show that to 
the extent it is possible to contain this source of instability, the state will sense less of a need to 
carry out reform. Prolonged global recovery, however, will continue to spark potential instances 
of political insecurity; greater appreciation for this dynamic will prompt a reengineering of 
policy.  
The Russian economic situation created by the 2008 crisis differs markedly from the 
1998 post-crisis conditions across several dimensions that illustrate increased global economic 
integration. Increased capital flows and implied economic, consumption and income risk, for 
example, suggest that if the Russian government wanted to maintain certain domestic 
employment and price levels, it should increase spending on programs aimed at mitigating risk to 
these factors. There is disagreement within existing scholarship over the degree to which the 
Kremlin underestimated the risk external forces posed to internal stability when constructing 
economic policy in the period 2000-2008. In any case, the 2008 crisis exposed the weaknesses of 
the system. The acute effects of Russia‘s two financial crises, despite their differences, and 
scholarship by Williamson, Drazen and Easterly indicating the existence of a link between crisis 
and economic reform
62
 justifies the use of this comparison and the choice of 2000 – 2008 as the 
                                                 
60
 “Russia Promises Auto Aid -- Kremlin Pledges Over $1 Billion in Bid to Avoid Layoffs.” Wall Street Journal. 
March 31, 2009.  
61
 Dmitri Sidorov, “Russia Should Open to Foreign Investment.” Forbes. March 12, 2009.  
62
 John Williamson (Ed.), “The political economy of policy reform.” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
January 1994 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
28 
―pre-crisis‖ time frame during which the social contract to be assessed (antecedent condition) 
came into being.   
Since the start of the crisis, the state demonstrated an evolution of interpretation of the 
length of recovery, at first devoting minimal attention to crisis and its effects on Russia, then 
acquiescing to the incontestable reality that much more elaborate involvement would be required 
on the part of the state. In this respect, policymakers have already ruled out the possibility of 
Russia escaping global crisis unscathed. Stephen Halliwell‘s three varying scenarios for the 
duration of global recession
63
 will provide a framework for an analysis of the future impact 
external forces will have on Russian balance sheets in three sectors and on social stability, a core 
component of the social contract. Conclusions regarding the tradeoffs between domestically 
oriented and externally driven policies inherent to each scenario will be made and compared to 
the policy choices made thus far by the Kremlin. In this manner, this analysis will provide insight 
into the importance of external scenario planning for the Russian government in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis.  
This thesis seeks to explain the effects of the crisis on the Russian social contract, that is, 
the particular balance of domestic spending and welfare provision with international economic 
integration sustained over the past eight years. The chosen analytical framework holds constant 
the Kremlin‘s desire to maintain its current level of political power in order to focus the analysis 
on the effects of globalization, as exacerbated by the financial crisis, as the primary causal 
mechanism in operation to limit the scope of viable policy choices. The purpose of this constant 
is to remove from consideration the possibility that Putin wishes to radically reduce his power 
for reasons unconnected to the crisis, altogether another field of inquiry; this is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the crisis will serve as a factor making the pursuit of this constant more 
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challenging. Though other authoritarian states and emerging economies undoubtedly also inject 
considerations about the global economy into policymaking, there are simply too many variables 
that must be controlled for in such comparative case studies; conversely, attempting to 
operationalize complex societal and political-economic arrangements would lessen the certainty 
with which any conclusions could be applied to Russia. The subjective nature of certain elements 
of the Kremlin ―response,‖ in particular, messaging, and the uniqueness of their expression to 
Russia‘s particular political and societal landscape render an event-driven process tracing 
analysis over several components of the crisis impact the most useful analytical approach. The 
next section will develop a full depiction of economic policy and its evolution in parallel with 
Russia‘s global economic integration since 1999 with the goal of illustrating the systemic points 
of greatest openness and vulnerability to external forces and the policies that created and 
sustained them. A comprehensive assessment of other determinants of economic policy, such as 
popular support and the preferences of policymaking clans, will provide the basis for evaluating 
the channels through which policymakers interpret the crisis and any changes in relative 
importance of the independent variables that have come about as a result. 
Having outlined a roadmap by which the analysis will proceed and noting the limitations 
of such an approach, the next chapter will identify a sequence of events that have occurred as 
part of the crisis since 2008. Process tracing will subsequently be carried out from each external 
event to actions taken by the Russian state. Alternative options will be identified by referencing 
scholarly works and commentary on the subject. In this examination it will be important to be 
mindful of the connections between external events, their impact through Russia‘s 
institutions/domestic setting, and features of the crisis that are primarily domestically-rooted.  
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EXTERNAL EVENTS 
 The 2008 global financial crisis hit Russia swiftly and severely, validating the assertion 
made in 2007 by experts Andrew Kuchins and Thomas Graham that, ―the state of the global 
economy is the most important external driver for Russia‘s future… If we experience a major 
recession or even more serious economic downturn in the next decade, Russia will be adversely 
affected.”
64
 In this section I will first construct an understanding of the drivers and main 
components of economic policy during the Putin presidency, as well as an outline of the major 
policies and government actions that would constitute a departure from the route set forth during 
this period. The relative importance of popular demands and social unrest in economic 
policymaking will be considered. In the first section of this chapter I will use process tracing to 
follow how incidents originating in foreign economies transmitted the economic crisis to Russia 
and what impact this had on government actions. Next, I will use events exemplifying the social 
dimension of the economic crisis as data points for analysis of the government‘s response. Given 
the exceptional magnitude and nature of the economic crisis, as well as the historical political 
apathy and tolerance for authoritarianism of the Russian population, I expect to find evidence 
that the government predicated its actions on the impact of the crisis and its future course, 
limited in its viable policy options as a result of external forces. The state likely continued to 
seek maintenance of the political status quo, but faced new challenges in doing so as a result of 
the crisis.  
 
Putin’s economic policy and its trajectory 
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In the words of Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes, Putin pursued ―dual policy objectives of 
optimal efficiency and maximum robustness to short-term shocks‖
65
 during his tenure as 
president (2000-2008). This comprised the establishment of firm federal government control 
over the economy and a symbiotic relationship with major players in the business sector. Making 
the Russian economy robust to crisis constituted a guiding principle for Putin‘s economic 
policymaking; based on the radical onset of economic depression in connection with the 1998 
financial crisis, the priority was ―not to invest in long-term growth but to invest in enhancing 
Russia‘s resiliency to short-term shocks.‖
66
  Repayment of foreign debt and accumulation of vast 
financial reserves demonstrated a commitment to establishing so-called Russian financial 
sovereignty, whereby the state would not have loan obligations to international organizations or 
foreign governments and would have the financial resources to cushion its internal prices and 
economy from unexpected economic shocks. Reserves of foreign-denominated currency are 
needed to cover critical imports, repayment schedules of foreign debt, and to defend the national 
currency to maintain a stable exchange rate. 
According to Anders Aslund, ―Putin‘s economic policy contains two constant, positive 
features: a strong emphasis on macroeconomic stability and high economic growth;‖67 there is 
agreement among experts that the Putin administration adhered to a conservative and responsible 
macroeconomic policy. Until October 2007, the government maintained fiscal discipline with 
budget surpluses every year from 2000 (ranging from 2.4 percent of GDP in 2001
68
 to 5.4 
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percent of GDP in 2007.
69
 When inflation began to rise, government expenditures increased. 
Prudent financial planning did occur during the latter half of Putin‘s presidency: the 
accumulation of oil-export duties and taxes for the extraction of natural resources into a National 
Stabilization Fund, set up in 2004, indicated Putin‘s desire to maintain budgetary surpluses and a 
cushion of foreign reserves in case of currency shocks. Concurrently, the federal government 
managed a relatively small budget constituting 21-22 percent of GDP, of which only a very 
limited portion was dedicated to development of infrastructure, education, technology and other 
areas. As a consequence, fiscal austerity caused the government to avoid large expenditures on 
―national projects‖ of proclaimed importance, such as health, education, housing and 
infrastructure. Inflation proved to be Putin‘s greatest challenge; a 40 percent jump in government 
spending and record net capital inflow of $82.3 billion in 2007 spurred price growth,70 which the 
Russian Central Bank struggled to manage concurrently with the exchange rate. By using ample 
foreign currency reserves to manage the ruble, the Central Bank effectively injected money into 
the domestic economy to weaken the currency, thereby fuelling inflation. 
 Putin‘s conception of the relationship between the state and big business hinged on a desire 
―to set up a system that could maximally exploit the advantages of the market economy while 
ensuring that the interests of private business owners would always remain subordinate to the 
strategic interests of the state.‖
71
 Importantly, Putin recognized and sought an efficient, modern 
economy, recognizing that it is a means to achievement of full sovereignty and the ability to 
shape Russia‘s destiny. In 2005, he described this condition by stating, ―Russia will decide itself 
how it can implement the principles of freedom and democracy, taking into account its historical, 
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geopolitical and other specificities. As a sovereign state, Russia can and will independently 
establish for itself the timeframe and conditions for moving along this path.‖
72
 For the purposes 
of this thesis, Putin‘s conception of sovereignty comprised financial sovereignty (freedom from 
outstanding foreign debts and substantial financial resources to counteract currency shocks) as 
well as international political sovereignty (including freedom from Western incursions into the 
former Soviet Union).
73
 Between 2000 and 2002 he augmented the market reforms initiated 
under Boris Yeltsin. A radical new flat income tax was introduced; registration, licensing and 
standardization for small and medium enterprises were simplified; and the sale of agricultural 
land became legal.
74
 Putin regularly spoke in favor of private ownership and the development of 
a robust, competitive economy. Concurrently, however, regular off-budget, so-called ―voluntary 
contributions,‖ by some of the country‘s largest and wealthiest companies to local and regional 
governments created a system of informal taxation by the state.
75
 The Yukos affair in 2003, 
during which Putin confiscated the successful company of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a big 
businessman and vocal critic of the Putin regime who controlled a large proportion of the private 
sector, ushered in an era of renationalization. As oil prices rose in 2004, all economic reform 
halted; the correlation between slowing reform and rising oil prices is evident here. By 2008, 
corruption, inefficient state enterprises, and arbitrary interpretation of tax codes plagued the 
economy in addition to a high dependency on commodity exports. As Andrew Kuchins notes, ―It 
would be wrong, however, simply to categorize Russia as a petro-state with a non-diversified 
economy. Microeconomic enterprise restructuring has also contributed to the Russian economic 
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boom, and other sectors of the economy…including consumer goods, construction, and 
telecommunications, are experiencing tremendous growth‖ which fuelled GDP expansion in 
2007 despite slumping oil prices.
76
 While progress did occur in these other sectors, the vast 
dominance of oil exports in economic growth overshadowed alternative channels in the 
government agenda. 
The Russian government demonstrated a firm commitment to market methods and openness 
to the global economy. Whereas Prime Minister Vladimir Putin did not devote significant 
attention to Russian accession to the World Trade Organization during his last term as president, 
President Dmitry Medvedev made many remarks about the benefits of joining for the Russian 
economy.
77
  In addition to encouraging international trade beginning in the early reform period 
and creating an environment receptive to foreign direct investment, the Russian government 
presided over the development of an internationally engaged financial sector. Russian firms held 
initial public offerings in New York and London, Western firms financed Russian companies‘ 
expansion, and foreigners actively traded shares on the Russian stock market. The country 
enjoyed $4.2 billion of portfolio foreign investment and nearly $500 billion in private credits 
from foreigners in 2007.
78
The combination of the firm reliance on natural resources as a driver of 
the economy and an underdeveloped financial sector motivated the emergence of the following 
arrangement to redistribute wealth from energy production back into the economy, a mechanism 
that ―remains key to understanding the country‘s political economy.‖
79
 Russian companies 
exported oil to the West; the Russian government taxed the export earnings; the Russian 
government lent this money to Western governments; and then, given the collateral represented 
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by Russian holdings of Western debt, Western banks lent the funds back to Russian companies, 
including those that had earned them in the first place.
80
 In effect, Western banks rolled over 
Russian corporate debts throughout the 2000s, providing financial intermediation that could not 
be obtained domestically.  During this time, major Russian firms prospered financially and 
expanded globally, all while accumulating extensive foreign debts; this development received 
little attention amidst the country‘s booming economic growth.   
 In September 2007 the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade published the 
―Concept of Long-term Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Federation,‖ which outlined 
a development plan through 2020 (also referred to as the Russia 2020 Plan). The ultimate goal of 
the Concept is for Russia to become one of the world‘s top five economies and establish itself as 
a leader in technological innovation and global energy infrastructure, as well as a major 
international financial center. Though much energy is devoted to outlining this vision of Russia 
as a center of innovation, scholars doubt that the plan‘s ambitious growth targets will be 
achieved due to the unwillingness of the government to address the root threats to growth. 
Kuchins, Aslund and others point out that since the introduction of this document little action has 
been taken in the sectors identified; according to these experts, the government‘s inaction 
regarding the Russia 2020 plan exemplifies the lack of credibility associated with such 
commitments.  
 Centralization of economic policymaking at the federal government level occurred during 
Putin‘s presidency, leading to what some scholars identify as a top structural challenge: a 
hypertrophied, inert and corrupt state bureaucracy. Michael McFaul notes that the 1998 financial 
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crisis ―put an end to major debate over economic policy in Russia,‖
81
 referring to the consensus 
for fiscal austerity which existed at the time between society and its rulers. Putin‘s rise to power 
coincided with a strengthening of authoritarianism and a rollback of democracy. Early in his 
tenure, Putin concentrated on consolidating political power in the Duma and Federation Council, 
and among regional governors. Having amassed substantial political capital (Putin‘s approval 
ratings stood at 70 percent in 2002
82
), he cleared the way for economic policy to be formulated at 
the top. McFaul notes that, ―with so much money from oil windfalls in the Kremlin's coffers, 
Putin could crack down on or co-opt independent sources of political power.‖
83
The government 
maintained the social contract existing prior to the crisis with relatively minimal social dissent, 
and certainly without large-scale threats to the existing order. In 2005, Putin responded to 
weeklong protests by pensioners by doubling increases in pension payments and reintroducing 
free public transport for these individuals.
84
 This so-called Chintz Revolution marked the first 
time that Putin‘s regime faced anything close to an existential challenge; it received serious 
attention in Russian and foreign media. Though the incident passed without revolution and 
political upheaval, in the view of Sam Greene it highlighted the existence of a latent 
dissatisfaction with the provisions of the social contract, a force that had potential to become 
overt under certain pressures.
85
 The Kremlin delayed responding to the 2005 unrest, perhaps a 
reflection of incoherence and poor preparation in internal deliberations about how to placate the 
dissatisfaction. Ultimately, Putin acquiesced, and despite temporarily dented popularity ratings 
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he maintained political power and sovereignty in economic decision-making. The pensioners‘ 
crisis did little to alter the weight that the welfare of the population at large carried in 
considerations of economic policymaking. ―Labor unrest has not played a large role in Russia 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union,‖
86
 write Andrew Kuchins and Thomas Graham. The 
residual memory of the 1990s has seemed to lead Russians to prefer stability and prosperity over 
democracy, a potential explanation for the parallel emergence of an enriched middle class and an 
increasingly authoritarian and centralized state.  
 With so much of Putin‘s economic policy predicated on sustained economic growth 
bolstered by high oil prices, the links between high natural resource rents and mounting 
autocracy would likely grow stronger. Existing literature describes the link between a ruling elite 
largely dependent on resource rents and the continuation of policies aimed at maintaining a 
degree of exclusive access to the benefits of these rents through authoritarian political policies. 
The suppression of democracy in the presence of this economic dynamic can continue until 
resources begin declining; in the case of Russia, the time horizon for falling commodities prices 
and oil and gas resource depletion seemed far off before the crisis, leading to the prediction that 
efforts at finding new sources of economic growth, improving investment and productivity, and 
especially policies favoring democracy faced little likelihood of becoming government priorities. 
The macroeconomic revolution that occurred between 2000 and 2008 fuelled the independence 
and power felt by those in the state apparatus. In December 2007, the public economic rhetoric 
became ―statist;‖ Putin espoused ―protectionism, state intervention, and subsidies,‖ lessening the 
probability of a shift to progressive structural reforms.
87
 Deviating from the economic trajectory 
constructed by Putin and continued by Medvedev would be costly from the perspective of the 
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ruling elite, as it would cause uncertainty over control of economic policy and, subsequently, the 
balance of power among individuals in leadership positions. Putin worked diligently to 
consolidate power in the early years of his presidency, and any deviation from this standard, 
whether necessitated by outside forces or by his own will, would likely occur gradually. 
Additionally, existing scholarship generally agrees on the lack the impetus for reform from 
below, that is, from the Russian populace, a phenomenon consistent with Russia‘s absence of a 
tradition of popular political activism. It is important to note, however, that the social contract 
and its associate authoritarianism thrives under the consent of the governed; Russian citizens do 
not want a return to the chaos and poverty of post-1998, and Putin offered a system addressing 
these concerns. In the words of Anders Aslund, ―the emergent, highly centralized government, 
combined with a weak and submissive society, is the hallmark of traditional Russian 
paternalism.‖
88
 
 
Conceptions of reform 
Given the trajectory set forth by these economic policies and priorities, which contain 
elements of economic liberalization and political centralization, it is possible to outline the 
actions and policies that would constitute reform. The understanding of immediate pre-crisis 
economic policy is limited, however by the multitude of mixed signals sent from the Kremlin 
regarding factors, such as the approach to state corporations and international integration, which 
continued when the crisis hit in late July 2008; as Aslund notes, ―Russia‘s course is difficult to 
discern because overt economic policy changes every few months with the oil price.‖89 
Nevertheless, experts and think tank leaders have put forth several papers outlining future 
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scenarios for Russia‘s political and economic situation, the most cited being Alternative Futures 
for Russia to 2017 from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It is important to 
distinguish between long-term, structural objectives carrying broader political and social 
implications and more distinct policies representing deviations from the pre-crisis course. 
 
Based on a variety of interpretations and analyses, reforms include: 
 Opening the closed economy and improvement of the business environment: 
deregulation, privatization, administrative reform freeing small and medium businesses 
from bureaucratic red tape;  
 Strengthening the rule of law and enforcement of property rights;90 
 Concentrated efforts at international cooperation and institutional integration: 
aggressive pursuit of WTO accession through negotiations and compliance with entry 
standards; 
 Improvement of productivity and greater openness: transparent procurement 
procedures for major investments, increase investment to over 23 percent of GDP; 
policy concentration on infrastructure and human capital; movement away from heavy 
monopolization in the economy, increasingly protectionist policies, and state support 
for failing industries 
 Greater macroeconomic stability through monetary policy: allow the ruble to float 
freely, relax preferred rate of 24–25 rubles to the dollar, target inflation as opposed to 
money supply, raise interest rates to achieve positive real interest rates 
 Improvement of the banking system: raise the general capital requirements of banks, 
reduce the amount of related party lending, privatization, increase foreign ownership 
 Fiscal policy (pro-cyclical in the pre-crisis period): pursue budget deficits with 
temporary fiscal stimuli (a combination of spending increases and targeted tax cuts) to 
unlock investment and boost flagging aggregate demand,91 adjust long-term 
expenditures to ensure fiscal sustainability 
 
Broadly speaking, measures causing the Russian economy to become less centralized, 
better managed with less state intervention, to exhibit more trust between business and 
government and less hostility to foreign investors all indicate reform. Furthermore, one can 
envision a more nuanced notion of ―reform:‖ having considered external factors more so than 
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before, the Russian government may pursue policies that do not differ significantly from pre-
crisis ones, or may in fact tip even further away from the above policies than before towards state 
involvement in economic affairs (for example, through nationalization). This response would 
indicate a ―tightening‖ of state control over the economy in attempt to mitigate perceived 
vulnerability caused by external forces. The existence of this type of shift motivated by external 
shocks from the financial crisis, while certainly more difficult to detect and prove, would 
demonstrate that Russian policymakers now interpret external factors differently – as 
necessitating stronger state guidance than before.   
Several actors hold a stake in Russian economic policymaking; this thesis assumes that 
Vladimir Putin retains a major influence over the direction of the country‘s economic 
development, and thus economic policy remained consistent during the transition of the 
presidency from Putin to Medvedev in 2008. In October 2008 Medvedev created a ―Council for 
the Development of the Financial Markets of the Russian Federation under the auspices of the 
President of the Russian Federation‖ and allocated the portfolio of financial policy to his array of 
powers, though financial policy and economic policy are typically handled by the Prime 
Minister.
92
 The Council is chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, who is also the 
head of the Anti-Crisis Committee of the government, and its members include Arkadij 
Dvorkovich, Medvedev‘s economic affairs aide, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister 
Alexei Kudrin, Minister for Economic Development and Trade Elvira Nabuillina, and Chairman 
of the Central Bank Sergei Ignatjev.
93
 Prime Minister Putin is not a member of the Council. The 
Ministry of Finance oversees macroeconomic stability and inflation control; the Central Bank 
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―stimulates‖ economic growth, which it has attempted to facilitate in the past decade by ―keeping 
the exchange rate at a lower level than it would be under a floating exchange rate regime.‖
94
 
 
Transmission of global crisis to Russia: process tracing of external events 
The Russian reaction to the global financial crisis evolved from initial confidence in the 
country‘s insulation from adverse effects and blaming of the American-led capitalist system to a 
realization the crisis threatened the utter collapse of entire segments of the Russian economy and 
the foundation of state power itself. Since the effects of the global crisis began to emerge in 
Russia in August 2008, Russian policymakers have implemented an extensive set of policy 
measures geared towards the provision of liquidity (domestic and external, short-term and long 
term), direct support to the stock markets and the banking sector, and fiscal support for the 
maintenance of the level of economic activity and of the exchange rate regime. Many actions of 
the Russian government occurred one to ten days after a significant event of foreign origin that in 
some manner transmitted the global crisis to Russia‘s capital and current accounts with negative 
consequences.  The transmission mechanisms may be broadly segmented into those originating 
in the financial sector and those operating through the real sector of the economy. 
Stimulus 
 In September 2008, the United States stock markets plunged as the global crisis hit its 
most critical stage. Sharp withdrawals from money markets instigated a global investment panic; 
as a result, international investors cashed out their Russian holdings – which at that point 
accounted for about half the Russian stock market – in a bid to generate cash and cover their 
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obligations elsewhere.
95
 By October 2008, foreign investors withdrew $74 billion out of the 
market.
96
 The dollar-denominated RTS and ruble-denominated MICEX (Russian stock markets) 
fell by 20 percent on September 16, 2008, eventually plummeting by over 60 percent.
97
 In 
response to these events, which had constricted the external debt-financing channels to Russian 
borrowers, the Russian government created a $130 billion rescue package under which the 
Central Bank and Finance Ministry bought shares in Russian companies and strengthened bank 
balance sheets. The Central Bank and National Welfare Fund would loan the equivalent of $36.1 
billion to Sberbank, VTB (formerly Vneshtorgbank) and VEB (Development Bank) at 7 percent 
interest for five years (later raised to ten years).
98
 These state-supported banks were instructed by 
the government to loan to Russian banks and corporations whose liquidity, previously foreign 
funded, had dried up with the massive capital outflows. European bank failures continued 
throughout September, causing a fluctuating Russian stock market and increasing liquidity 
pressures.  Medvedev pledged an estimated 400 billion rubles ($15 billion) of additional 
liquidity, and the reserve requirements dropped to 0.5 percent.
99
 Liquidity injections continued 
until February 2009 and represented the first time in years that the Central Bank had used a 
policy other than restriction of foreign exchange reserves to drive monetary growth. 
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Exchange rate  
 Capital outflows catalyzed by global crisis impacted the Russian government‘s exchange 
rate policy. Between 2002 and 2008 the ruble, bolstered by high oil prices and large balance of 
payments surpluses, appreciated 36 percent to the dollar, encouraging foreign borrowing and 
making exports, particularly those in commodities, more globally competitive (see Chart 2).
100
  
Prior to November 2008, the Central Bank was able to maintain the ruble within its 
desired dollar exchange rate despite a 4.5 percent fall in September, spending a total of $16.7 
billion in the week ending October 3.
101
 
Total hard currency reserves amounted 
to $546 billion, down from a peak of 
$596 billion on July 31.
102
 In November 
2008, however, the country experienced 
a sharp reduction in its trade surplus 
(caused by a fall in global oil prices, 
detailed below), initiating depreciation 
and large capital outflows that prompted 
a shift in the Central Bank‘s exchange 
rate policy (see Chart 4). Internally, defense of the ruble likely came to be viewed as too rigid; in 
its place, the Central Bank began employing incremental devaluations of roughly 1 percent 
against the previously used basket comprised of 55 percent US dollar and 45 percent Euro. As 
the year, and the crisis, progressed, the devaluations became more frequent: ―from once per week 
in November 2008, they reached three devaluations per week in December 2008, and four by 
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mid-January 2009.‖
103
 Gradual devaluation 
―allowed households to protect savings, 
banks to arbitrage between unsecured loans 
and the pace of devaluation pace, and 
helped stabilize banking sector,‖
104
 but 
made foreign exchange speculation very 
profitable; to address this issue, the Bank 
of Russia raised interest rates to stabilize 
devaluation expectations. According to an 
analysis by Sberbank, one of Russia‘s state 
banks, the policy of gradual devaluation caused lost GDP growth.
105
 On January 22, 2009, the 
Central Bank stated that it would allow the ruble to fall freely up to 10 percent, then pledged to 
defend it indefinitely at this level. Anders Aslund recognizes the present level as a ―realistic 
market exchange rate.‖
106
Although hemorrhaging foreign exchange reserves seemed to indicate a 
policy mistake at first blush, the policy of gradual devaluation represented an appropriate 
response to the externally driven portfolio investment and capital outflows. According to 
Deutsche Bank Research, the chosen policy allowed the Central Bank to ―ensure an orderly 
deleveraging of private-sector external debtors without major bankruptcies, [and] avoid massive 
deposit runs that could have brought the banking sector under additional serious stress.‖
107
 
Alternatively, the government could have allowed the currency to crash – since most Russian 
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institutions, large companies, and the Russian government hold their reserves in dollars and euro, 
this policy would have harmed small and medium Russian enterprises and the average citizen.
108
 
The combination of tempered devaluation with continued foreign exchange reserve depletion 
indicates a nuanced adaptation of economic goals (gradual lowering of exchange rate and 
subsequent rise in domestic prices to accommodate social stability, and safeguarding of financial 
positions of important banks and corporations) to crisis realities.  
Budget   
Commodities prices constitute a key driver of Russian GDP growth in addition to 
external, fiscal and monetary developments. The fall of global commodities prices by nearly 75 
percent since July 2008 carried significant ramifications for the Russian economy. Crude oil and 
gas account for two-thirds of Russian exports, and thus continued increase in export prices over 
2003-2008 improved Russia‘s terms-of-trade by more than 120%.
109
 On October 16, 2008, oil 
prices dropped below $70 per barrel, coinciding with a drop in Russian oil production.
110
 Total 
oil exports fell 10 percent year-on-year in October.
111
 In September 2008, Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin announced that Russia‘s 2009 budget would enter a 
deficit if oil prices sank below $70 per barrel.
112
 Two months later, Kudrin pronounced 
acceptance of a long-term drop in oil prices and that the existing state budget plans will hold 
unchanged if the oil prices stabilize on 50 dollars per barrel mark.
113
 In 2009, the government 
increased its expenditures by 33 percent in an anti-crisis stimulus package. Indeed, the federal 
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budget entered a deficit that year, its first in a decade; in February 2009 First Deputy Prime 
Minister Igor Shuvalov announced plans to limit the deficit by introducing budgetary cuts, a 
policy which would serve to protect foreign exchange resources. This policy directly 
demonstrates consideration for external events: by turning away from a sustained policy of 
increasing public spending, or maintaining the pre-crisis level, the government indicated 
awareness that continued low oil prices may cause a prolonged recession, seriously degrading the 
cushion of foreign exchange reserves and limiting the scope of future recession-combating 
measures. Since this policy is contractionary in nature, it opposes the ambitious growth goals 
pursued before the crisis. However, in light of the severe constraints imposed by the global 
slowdown in demand for commodities, this is a fiscally responsible response balancing stimulus 
and appreciation for the possibility of a sustained global ―rainy day‖ scenario.     
 
Interaction with big business 
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The stock market crash, plunging commodities prices and global credit crunch each 
contributed to a deterioration of the ability of many Russian state corporations
114
 and banks to 
generate revenues, finance acquisitions and roll over debts (see Chart 3). Struggling companies 
such as Lukoil, Rusal and Norilsk Nickel became debtors of the state in 2008 and 2009, 
surrendering shares in their companies and board seats as collateral for receipt of loans disbursed 
by Vneshekonombank (VEB).
115
  In September 2008 the Ministry of Finance increased the 
number of banks with access to 
budget funding from three to 
twenty-eight,
116
 and in February 
2009 the state put rehabilitation 
of the banking sector, which was 
then mired in write-offs from 
bad loans to Russian companies, 
at the forefront of its agenda in a 
shift away from attention to 
industry.
117
 First Deputy Prime 
Minister Shuvalov‘s comments 
on this shift illustrated a seeming realization within the government that it would have to be 
much more selective in disbursing state aid than ever before, especially to businesses with which 
it has close ties. Coinciding with changes imposed by the global economic climate, namely the 
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downgrading by Fitch Ratings of Russia‘s credit rating based on large-scale capital outflows and 
rapid reserve depletion, Shuvalov ―suggested the government might have been wrong‖ to lend 
$4.5 billion, its largest bailout loan, to Rusal, and discontinued a $50 billion support fund 
intended to assist ―magnates at risk of losing stakes in their companies to margin calls.‖
118
 Until 
recently, small- and medium-sized enterprises were ignored by policymakers, as criteria for 
government credit guarantees included annual sales of over 15 billion rubles or half billion 
dollars and a workforce of no less than 4,000 employees.
119
 As the size of state funds themselves 
varies with the rate of inflation and volatile oil prices, there is broader uncertainty about the 
economic capacity of the state to maintain control over the business community as before. On 
one hand, the constraints on federal tax revenues would imply a sobering effect on spending for 
support to the private sector and a policy of lending to the firms that would use funds most 
efficiently in order to stimulate the economy. Russia‘s tycoons, however, control the companies 
that are most closely tied to the state (for example, RusAl, Gazprom, Aeroflot, Rosneft, among 
others) and are considered to be the most inefficient and corrupt. Thus, the problem of leading 
the country out of crisis and the arrangement of existing state-business relationship imposes new 
challenges for maintaining the existing regime and political system. In the next section, more 
attention will be devoted to explaining the Economist‘s recent statement that ―The Kremlin is 
bailing out the business tycoons it was once expected to curb‖
120
 from the perspective of both 
societal demands and domestic politics. 
 
International cooperation 
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 As the crisis unfolded, the attitude of the Russian state to international cooperation 
evolved from disinterest to desire for leadership and discussion. In October 2008, when Russian 
leaders still widely denied the presence of crisis in their country, Kremlin spokesmen 
communicated a cool reception of an invitation by the US to hold a summit to discuss the 
international crisis. Dmitry Peskov, spokesman for Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, said it was 
too early to determine who from Russia would attend, if at all.
121
 Three months later, in January 
2009, Putin urged the development of multiple, regional reserve currencies in addition to the 
dollar, noting "excessive dependence on a single reserve currency is dangerous for the global 
economy."
122
 This constituted an altered approach to the nature of the crisis: the blame, 
according to Putin, now fell on the system created and mismanaged by the United States, and 
Russia offered a solution to the problem. The assertive independence characteristic of the 
Kremlin‘s rhetoric during the boom years was replaced by a more conciliatory tone towards the 
US, despite potential hostility in late 2008 stemming from failure to agree on Russian accession 
to the WTO and US criticism on the invasion of Georgia; Putin wished the Obama team luck and 
said he looked forward to cooperating in the future.
123
 
In April 2009 Russian and Chinese leaders signed twelve bilateral agreements on 
cooperation in energy and finance, supporting agreement by companies from both nations for 
building 205 joint projects in the Russian Far East, Siberia, and northeast China.
124
 Earlier in the 
year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had, like Putin, called for tighter regulation of the 
international financial system and reserve currencies and blamed the inappropriate 
macroeconomic policies of some nations for the crisis. Given China‘s increased importance in 
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the international economy, Putin may have attempted to align his country more closely China as 
a bet on the future benefits of such an alliance. The central role of the state in managing both 
country‘s economies rendered China a more suitable ally at a time when Russia opposed 
America‘s economic program and brand of capitalism. Through June 2009, President Medvedev 
continued to cautiously promote this position, stating at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, 
―The artificial and monopolar support of a monopoly on key segments of the world economy 
became the fundamental cause of the crisis.‖
125
 On the eve of the Group of 20 Summit in 
September 2009, however, calls for new global reserve currencies waned. Presidential aide 
Arkady Dvorkovich did not discredit the idea entirely, but offered a timeline of uncertain length 
for when such a scenario might arise. Further tempering the Russian government‘s tone, he 
reiterated President Medvedev‘s acknowledgement that Russian shortcomings, not simply the 
irresponsible actions of the US, had contributed to transmitting crisis to his country.
126
 By this 
point, the negative effects of the crisis had hampered significant parts of the Russian economy 
and consumed the state resources; realizing the magnitude of the downturn and the futility of 
denying its existence and Russia‘s role in its occurrence, Putin, Medvedev and others took a 
pragmatic and active, not victimized or defeatist, approach to the international anti-crisis 
dialogue.  
 
Analysis 
 After process tracing from externally driven disturbances to government responses, 
substantial evidence exists that the Russian state responded directly to these instances through 
distinct policy measures following an initial period of skepticism regarding the magnitude of 
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influence these forces could exert on the country‘s economy. Massive liquidity injections, 
gradual devaluation of the ruble, a revision of the federal budget based on projections of lower 
global oil prices, and bailouts to state-supported banks and corporations each demonstrate shifts 
in state policies occurring directly as a result of the determination that previous policies were 
untenable in the conditions created by the crisis circumstances. Based on the assessment of pre-
crisis policy and the low likelihood that policies outlined above and others in a similar a vein of 
reform would be undertaken in the absence of such a cataclysmic event, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the state adopted these measures out of a sense of necessity given the economic 
environment sprouted in Russia by the crisis. Additionally, the instances of willingness to 
cooperate, or at least continue to interact with other nations demonstrates Russian leaders‘ desire 
to increase Russia‘s presence in global economic affairs as an extension of its desire not to end 
up on the periphery of world politics. China‘s rise on the global stage and its more successful 
navigation of the crisis has made it both a threat and an opportune partner for Russia. 
Adjustments in Russian foreign policy may be necessary if the country is to avoid 
marginalization in the international economy: increasing influence in global processes will likely 
require a more conciliatory and less ideological approach to interactions with the United States, 
France, and other major powers. 
 Having traced the impact of external events on Russia‘s macroeconomic indicators, 
federal government, big business, and foreign economic relations, the analysis now turns to 
consider the consequences of crisis for the majority of Russians. Their experiences differed 
widely from that of individuals in large state corporations, but the collective negative impact on 
popular sentiment yielded a detectable discontent whose effects on state economic policy must 
be examined. 
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SOCIAL PRESSURES 
Threat of social pressure, defined as popular discontent from average citizens, heightened 
between September 2008 and April 2009. While large-scale street protests were unthinkable in 
the last five years, several instances of explicit opposition to government policies occurred 
during this time, though overall social unrest has been ―isolated and parochial.‖
127
 The adverse 
impact of the crisis in the real economy affected aggregate demand, labor demand and asset 
prices: prices rose for staples such groceries, the number of poor increased by roughly 2.7 
million people in 2009,
128
 and unemployment hovered around 13 percent in 2009.
129
 As is 
generally characteristic of the government response to the crisis and ambiguity about future 
economic development, Cliff Levy pointed out in February 2009 that ―the authorities remain 
unsure whether to address the country's financial troubles with a thaw or a crackdown.‖
130
 In 
December 2008, the Russian government raised tariffs on imported automobiles in an effort to 
protect domestic manufacturers. Many citizens of Vladivostok earn their livelihood by importing 
used Japanese cars and thus took to the streets in response, asserting that the tariff had devastated 
sales of such vehicles and left many families impoverished. Special riot police sent by the 
Kremlin from Moscow initiated a bold crackdown more aggressive than any similar response in 
recent years.
131
 As capital continued to flow out of the country and the general economic outlook 
deteriorated, state actions in Vladivostok exhibited the heightened sensitivity of the Kremlin to 
popular uprisings, most of which occurred in ―monocities‖ – areas whose existence depends 
largely on a single firm or industry such as construction, manufacturing or retail trade. According 
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to the Institute of Regional Policy (IRP), over 20 percent of the Russian population lives in 
roughly 460 such single-industry cities, whose production facilities account for more than 40% 
of Russian GDP.
132
 By sharply reducing the revenue of the companies driving the economies of 
monocities and making the attainment of loans nearly impossible, the crisis forced cuts to social 
welfare expenditures. Rollbacks such as continuing non-payments of wages, firings, and decline 
in the living standards are more salient to ordinary Russians, many of whom are unfamiliar 
government actions regarding the exchange rate, support to the financial sector, and the federal 
budget, but agitate for welfare spending and pensions. On this dimension, the situation exhibited 
similarities to the 2005 pensioners‘ strike: on ―bread and butter‖ issues, broad affected segments 
of the population are capable of demonstrating signs of discontent.   
A series of economic protests in Pikalevo in June 2009 received national attention as a 
result of Vladimir Putin‘s personal visit. In a public address characteristic of the paternalistic, 
assertive crisis-management techniques of past Russian leaders, Putin ordered the owners of the 
town‘s cement factory to re-open its doors. Keeping the industries of the monocities open, 
however, is inefficient. Relics of the Soviet era maintained through federal support, their 
products are inferior to imported substitutes, and their operations inefficient and outdated.
133
 
Before the crisis, monocities received relatively little investment and development attention from 
the government; by negatively impacting the direct livelihood of their populations, the crisis has 
made them epitomes of Russia‘s gravest infrastructure and inefficiency woes and sharply 
elevated their importance for Putin and Medvedev. Minister of Economic Development Elvira 
Nabiullina stated that the unrest in Pikalevo prompted the decision to appropriate $315 million to 
assist two hundred of the most threatened monocities and to more closely monitor their 
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problems.
134
 Putin‘s personal involvement has indeed come on the heels of social unrest, 
evidence of vigilance to popular concerns, a populist manner of maintaining political power. The 
experiences of 1998 and 2005 demonstrated to Putin that there is a certain value in nipping 
nascent social flare ups in the bud early, as they have the potential to evolve into more 
destabilizing problems for the state if allowed to fester. 
The government response to the social pressures unleashed by the crisis has a dual nature. 
On one hand, there have been many highly publicized instances geared towards showcasing the 
continued strength of the state, its concern for the welfare of its people, and its ability to mitigate 
the negative social effects of the crisis. These include Putin‘s promise of more state aid for the 
machine tools and car industries in August 2009 following continued protests of wage cuts at 
AvtoVAZ. Two days after an opinion poll revealed that high food prices were the chief concern 
of 75 percent of Russians, Putin stormed into a Moscow supermarket and decried the high price 
of sausages.
135
 In its negative pressure on employment, poverty reduction, wages and prices for 
staple food and living items, the crisis directly threatened the principal pillar of Putin‘s 
legitimacy, the provision of improving living standards and economic stability, in a manner not 
seen over the course of Putin‘s eight-year presidency. Between 2008 and 2009 the fact that not 
only the politically marginalized expressed vocal protest proved to unsettle federal officials: in 
November 2008 Medvedev ―instructed law enforcement agencies to stamp out any unrest and 
take action against those seeking to ‗exploit the consequences‘ of the financial crunch.‖
136
 Yet 
the fiscal response to the crisis up to April 2009 primarily targeted banks and firms rather than 
households through a lower tax burden and direct support, with a smaller share of total stimulus 
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devoted to on-the-job training, temporary work programs, and higher unemployment benefits.
137
 
Furthermore, in November 2009 Putin revealed that the amount devoted to the labor market in 
2010 will be less than the 2009 stimulus for similar measures. The announcement, at the end of 
an address to the 11
th
 party congress of United Russia, Putin‘s political party, did not figure into 
the top policy priorities of modernizing sectors of strategic national importance, improving 
Russia‘s high tech industry, stimulating housing and boosting domestic demand.
138
 
On the other hand, limited financial resources implied the government could no longer 
shore up AvtoVAZ and others without introducing new considerations of ―how to restructure 
local enterprises, bring in new sources of employment or, as a last resort, shut them down.‖
139
 In 
this vein, President Medvedev ordered a probe into the operation of state corporations in August 
2009 following a reduction of the working week at AvtoVAZ, which received billions of rubles 
in state aid.
140
 Such moves, however, have yet to result in a notable reformulation of the state‘s 
relationship with these major corporations to the benefit of more transparent operations. 
Furthermore, measures targeting the elite at times almost directly superseded populist messages: 
less than a week after Putin‘s derision of Oleg Deripaska‘s management of the Pikalevo cement 
factory, state-controlled Vneshtorgbank extended another credit line to Deripaska.
141
 
Overall, government policy since the start of the crisis through 2009 has shown a 
continuation of Putin‘s pre-crisis balancing of oligarchs and other elite interests; the economic 
crisis imposed new limitations on the tools which could be used towards this end. Thus far, the 
state has managed to preserve its symbiotic relationship with the oligarchs, utilizing some as 
scapegoats for the layoffs and wage arrears inflicted on average Russians. As Gregory White and 
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Alexander Kolyandr note,  "Most likely, the decision on [automobile] import duties was made in 
order to help Kremlin favorites like Sergei Chemezov and Oleg Deripaska whose holding 
companies own the AvtoVAZ and GAZ carmakers;‖
142
 the state‘s support of these tycoons and 
others shows that the need to demonstrate some degree of control over big business existed 
during the acute period of crisis as it did before the crisis, especially since promises of support to 
various sectors initially ―appeared to me made as and when those sectors came to the 
government looking for help rather than as part of a carefully considered stimulus package.‖
143
 
As the crisis wore on, the fiscal constraints facing the state came into sharper view, and ―the idea 
of a ‗rescue list' for oligarchs mooted in the autumn of 2008 was quietly abandoned.‖
144
 In this 
manner, Putin has been able to keep his preferred method of state control over big business while 
providing isolated and targeted support to those deemed most worthy – whether based on 
political or economic considerations. White and Kolyandr question whether doling out large 
stimulus sums to favored enterprises will save the domestic car industry, a concern echoed by 
those who believe the crisis response foreshadows a continuation of heavy state interference in 
the economy, favoritism towards big business, and a lack of attention towards investment and 
development of a competitive and business environment.
145
 
 Rising inflation, unemployment and wage arrears, three major factors of importance to the 
Russian population, threatened to ignite future opposition to the government economic program. 
A study conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research center (VTsIOM) revealed 
inflation and growing prices as the main problems seen by Russians as the top threats facing the 
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country (61 percent of respondents ranked these problems at their major concerns).
146
 Inflation 
targeting received little attention during the acute phase of crisis, when measures for financial 
sector revitalization and gradual devaluation took precedence. According to Deutsche Bank, 
official plans to switch to an inflation-targeting framework do exist.
147
 It seems likely, however, 
that ―the Central Bank will continue to pursue exchange rate targets and, simultaneously, aim to 
lower inflation,‖
148
 which will be challenging given the volatility of capital flows exacerbated by 
the economic crisis. Rising inflation, however, is largely contingent on rising oil prices; even 
without a significant state focus on limiting inflation in 2009, its level declined to 8.8 percent in 
December 2009 from 14 percent in March 2009 and may fall lower in 2010,
149
 a well-established 
correlation supported by economic scholarship. Between August 2008 and December 2009, the 
critical level of inflation at which social and political unrest sets in, judged to be 15 percent by 
many economists,
150
 did not occur. Overall, though the crisis has prompted a reevaluation of 
monetary policy as evidenced by official statements regarding the high inflation rate and interest 
rate decisions, this reassessment did not come about rapidly as a result of social disruptions 
related to high food prices. These social disruptions, in turn, were minimal as a result of 
rebounding oil prices. In the long term, inflation targeting can be achieved through a 
commitment to fostering investment and domestic savings – a reform scenario as dictated earlier 
in this thesis. It is clear that though crisis has contributed to planting the seeds of a new 
willingness to consider these policy options, any structural reforms or coherent, resolute pursuit 
of these goals will likely not occur in 2010 if the social impact of the crisis lessens with moderate 
global recovery. 
                                                 
146
 ―Russians fear economic crisis more than democratic freedom restrictions –poll.‖ Interfax. January 23, 2009. 
147
 ―Russia in the financial crisis and beyond.‖ Deutsche Bank Research. 
148
 Ibid 
149
 ―Fitch Upgrades Russia Outlook to Stable.‖ BusinessWeek. January 22, 2010.  
150
 Ira Iosebashvili,―High Inflation Raises Specter of Unrest.‖ The Moscow Times. March 18, 2009. 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
58 
 Criticism of the government‘s crisis response and broader economic policy has also come 
from a faction of respected Russian economists, former politicians, business leaders and scholars 
which has begun to question the fundamental principles of the authoritarian regime, evidence of 
the critical nature of the current period for the country‘s future development. In November 2008, 
Dr. Evgeny Gontmakher, head of a social policy research centre in the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, authored an article explaining how protests could ripple through monocities to ignite a 
violent social uprising similar to a notorious Soviet-era eruption.
151
 Though a senior government 
official chastised Gontmakher for his ―extremism,‖ his predictions were also deemed by officials 
to be incorporated into crisis management strategy.
152
 The presence of special forces to quell 
unrest in Vladivostok followed this development. In February 2009 the Institute of 
Contemporary Development, a Moscow think tank run by Igor Yurgens, a liberal economist and 
one of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's closest economic-policy advisers, sharply criticized 
the government for its actions in response to the crisis and outlined measures for shedding the 
country‘s dependence on commodities exports and a bureaucratic dead weight. In an interview, 
Yurgens noted the lack of dialogue and accountability between the state and common Russians 
in regard to economic measures. On January 16, 2009, an open letter signed by former Prime 
Minister Mikhail Gorbachev, Vladimir Ryzhkov, a liberal former member of parliament, and 
Russian billionaire and former government official Alexander Lebedev condemned the 
government‘s tight control of politics and crisis management and accused leaders of unfairly 
bailing out favored wealthy businessmen at the expense of taxpayers. In March 2009, Boris 
Nemtsov, a former vice-premier, and Vladimir Milov, a former energy minister, issued a report 
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outlining the failed crisis response policies of the Putin-Medvedev tandem.
153
 Amidst the 
crystallization of perspectives on the major sources of Russia‘s failure and the regime‘s role in 
the future of the country, control over television, which is ―completely whitewashed by the 
Kremlin's censors‖
154
 has contributed to maintenance of popular support for the regime and a 
lack of coherent reply to the diatribes of liberal critics.  
 Certain individuals within the government have expressed discontent with the charges 
levied by critics; interpretation of these expressions will be carried out as part of the analysis of 
domestic politics and actors in the following chapter. It will be necessary to attempt to discern 
whether ideological or personal interests of policymakers have dictated actions in recent years, 
and thus whether the crisis is an input into the considerations of these individuals, or its own 
independent variable exerting significant influence on policy.     
 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 
 The 2008 economic crisis initiated a new chapter in the struggle for power within the 
Russian political establishment. As the single greatest short-term challenge facing the regime 
between August 2008 and the end of 2009, the turmoil disrupted the mechanism created by Putin 
to maintain a balance of power between two main competing factions in the ruling elite, the 
civiliki and the siloviki. In proposing solutions to the economic downtown and addressing the 
reform agenda, government officials have demonstrated varying ideologies and approaches to 
governance, suggesting the existence of competition for political power among various groups 
and individuals. The personal preferences of top economic decision makers, that is, their 
ideological leanings, may be viewed as alternative explanatory factors driving the crisis response 
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and movements toward economic reform. In this view, officials with liberal mentalities pursue 
certain policies despite economic circumstances or considerations regarding personal power. 
More broadly, Russia‘s unique domestic political landscape may exert a more critical influence 
on economic policy than either the externally imposed constraints on the economy or the 
detrimental effects to society. I posit that the government response to the crisis through 
December 2009 reflects, at least to some degree, attempts by Putin and his trusted inner circle of 
government officials to protect their legitimacy and personal interests while responding 
appropriately to the adverse externally imposed and social effects of the crisis. The economic 
turmoil ignited various points of disruption that both threatened the existing policies and the 
individuals promoting them, and seemingly opened the door for contrarian viewpoints on 
economic management to be voiced within the government.  
 To be certain, as the crisis developed, the problem of how to address it received attention 
from the Putin-Medvedev tandem. The actions and messages of the two leaders have at times 
opposed one another; in other instances, the attitudes have been consistent. Later, Medvedev 
focused on championing the need for eradication of corruption and liberalization of the Russian 
political system, whereas Putin continued to assert the value of the state‘s role in supporting 
economic affairs. The nature of the ruling duopoly has been a central topic of debate among top 
scholars and Russia experts; this thesis assumes that at the start of 2010, Prime Minister Putin 
retains a monopoly on the country‘s political resources. Prior to the beginning of the economic 
crisis, President Medvedev lacked Putin‘s strong personal charisma and confidence in his 
popularity with Russians, as well as an influential inner circle capable of ousting Putin‘s 
incumbent allies. Heralded by some as a leader more open to Western-style democracy and one 
with a less aggressive style, Medvedev appeared to be a subordinate of Putin, his long-time 
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mentor, despite making public declarations of intentions to reform several dimensions of Russian 
society. Speculations about the precise terms of the power sharing agreement and the degree to 
which Medvedev can influence his own destiny in the regime flourished; yet the Russian 
political system remains an enigma. This thesis assumes, however, that Medvedev and several 
others do harbor personal desires to liberalize and modernize the Russian economy and have 
pursued these goals not opportunistically, but steadily. By challenging the successfulness of the 
basic economic policy associated with Putin, the crisis may have bolstered the legitimacy of the 
program advocated by members of the liberal-leaning faction. Two questions arise: to what 
extent can Putin control the emergence of this group and its principles, that is, has the crisis 
limited his ability to ensure his own political survival through suppression of competing 
interests, and to what extent does he actually wish to do so, that is, does Putin in fact desire to 
maintain the status quo, or does he recognize the need for the power structure to evolve? While 
critical junctures such as economic crises may render a country susceptible to political or 
economic upheaval, policies are ultimately the choices of individuals. A multitude of questions 
surrounds the political dimension of economic policymaking and reform in Russia, most of 
which are vastly outside the research parameters of this thesis and which other scholars 
acknowledge as generating speculative answers. Instead, I will focus on describing the 
ideological inclinations and policy preferences of key leadership factions and economic 
policymakers and the instances of various policies that may indicate the influence of certain 
groups. Linkages may then be made between proponents of successful policies and shifting 
balances of power within the government. 
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Putin’s agenda 
 During his first term, Putin consolidated power by appealing to a wide variety of interest 
groups; this period coincided with the introduction of the structural reforms described earlier. 
However, in 2003 and 2004, the year of Putin‘s reelection, deinstitutionalization, centralization 
and state capitalism came into focus as the chief pursuits of the Putin administration.
155
By 
choosing Mikhail Fradkov as his Prime Minister and reducing German Gref‘s power, Putin 
―transformed his reform government into a non-reform government‖
156
 to allow his closest allies, 
the siloviki, to amass power at the expense of reformers. As the executive branch amassed power, 
factionalism, personality clashes and bureaucratic maneuvering carried more weight in policy 
determination.
157
 Putin‘s dual goals of macroeconomic stability and high economic growth did 
not require reform due to high oil prices and capital inflow from foreign investors attracted to 
state-controlled companies‘ high asset values. The stifling of reform also coincided with the 
public discontent with Putin in relation to the 2005 attempt at pension reform. Throughout his 
second term, Putin words stood at odds with his actions: while espousing the merits of 
privatization, he carried out large-scale renationalization of efficient enterprises. Anders Aslund 
contends that this effort was driven by ―state officials‘ interest to extend their power and wealth‖ 
because it was not part of a broader socialist or nationalist ideology, and converted well-
functioning, ―superior‖ private enterprises into less efficient tools of the state.
158
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Siloviki 
 Putin‘s closest colleagues from his tenure in the Russian security services and the St. 
Petersburg government have occupied key positions in the state administration and state-run 
companies since 2000; they and others who share common political views and pursue similar 
economic interests form the siloviki faction. According to Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap, the 
term is derived from the word silovyestruktury, Russian for ―force structures,‖ a reference to the 
―armed services, law enforcement bodies, and intelligence agencies that wield the coercive 
power of the state.
159
 Though not all members of the siloviki  clan are current and former 
officials from these government agencies, the term is used by Western analysts for familiarity.
160
 
Leading this group is Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who is responsible for Russia‘s energy 
sector and also serves as Chairman of Rosneft. Sechin and other government officials and 
businessmen, including Russian Railways head Vladimir Yakunin, First Deputy Prime Minister 
Sergei Ivanov, Rostekhnologii head Sergei Chemezov, champion the notion of a sovereign and 
independent Russia, led by a strong state able to exert influence over a significant portion of the 
economy, whose natural resources belong to the Russian people – Ian Bremmer refers to these 
preferences as ―statism‖ and ―economic nationalism.‖
161
The siloviki have shown their intention 
to control the country‘s major economic resources, for instance, through Rosneft‘s acquisition of 
smaller oil and gas firms, likely motivated by a desire for personal enrichment as well as 
continued political influence.
162
 
 
 
                                                 
159
 Ibid 
160
 Ibid 
161
 Ibid 
162
 Ibid 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
64 
Civiliki 
 Experts have claimed the existence of a faction of so-called liberal reformers in the 
Russian governmentsince the early 1990s. This group is linked to President Medvedev‘s political 
ascendancy, with many of its members originating in the civil law network in St. Pertersburg. 
Western media refers to the civiliki as intellectuals interested in pursuing democratic reforms and 
modernizing the country. The term refers to the origins of most members of the clan in the St. 
Petersburg civil law agencies.
163
 Proponents of market economies with transparent and 
competitive practices, they seek to shift the focus of economic development to increasing 
investment in the country instead of continuing the harvesting of commodities exports revenues 
into government funds. First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, First Deputy Chief of Staff 
Vladislav Surkov, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, former Minister for Economic Development 
German Gref, Chief Economic Advisor to President Medvedev Arkadiy Dvorkovich, and 
Economic Development and Trade Minister Elvira Nabuillina have each been associated with the 
government‘s liberal faction, albeit with varying degrees. Dvorkovich has stated that, ―The 
government cannot replace the private sector, the market, and business, nor is it going to do 
so;"
164
 in February 2010 he authored an article appearing in The Huffington Post encouraging the 
Russian state to act ―pragmatically by formulating both a plan of priorities and the basics of 
long-term policy‖
165
 for ―the innovative renewal of the Russian economy.‖ In pursuit of 
privatization and structural reforms, the civiliki support the release of state corporations from the 
control of siloviki associates, whose management they view as inefficient and corrupt. The 
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reinvigoration of a strong business relationship with the West also constitutes a goal of this 
group.  
 
Domestic politics during the crisis 
A variety of individuals have played key roles in constructing the government anti-crisis 
plan since August 2008. In the most acute phase of the crisis, lasting through October 2008, 
Putin and Medvedev both met with business leaders to discuss state bailouts for corporations 
facing serious liquidity challenges. In November 2008 Putin spoke to a meeting of his political 
party, United Russia, introducing stimulus measures and optimistically setting forth the goal of 
using the crisis to strengthen the economy.
166
 In this speech, he underscored his intention to 
render the state the dominant provider of credit to institutions in need and thus strengthen its 
control via bailouts and liquidity injections. As problems spread to the real economy, however, 
Putin made a greater effort to appear in as protector of the Russian people against injustice – an 
image he has promoted throughout his political life – appearing, as noted earlier, in supermarkets 
and publicly scolding an oligarch. Given the weight macroeconomic stability and the lack of 
societal chaos carry in the Putin formula for power, these overtures come as no surprise. Aside 
from wide-sweeping remarks about the need for restoration of the pre-crisis economy, Putin 
refrained from becoming intimately involved with the formulation of specific anti-crisis 
measures. In April 2009 he introduced a 2010 budget that carried a large fiscal deficit, a small 
investment budget, and populist measures such as an increase in pensions through direct 
payments that deviated from Medvedev‘s ideas regarding innovations.
167
 Liberal critics lamented 
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the lack of attention to the anti-crisis goals of clearing bad loans from the banking system and 
addressing inefficiencies in state-supported enterprises.  
In December 2008 Putin formed a new Anti-Crisis Commission (formally, the 
Governmental Commission on Sustainable Development of the Russian Economy) to handle 
both the economic and social dimensions of the crisis. Igor Shuvalov leads on economic and 
business issues, while Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov is in charge of mitigating the 
societal impact of the crisis. Acting on Putin‘s orders, the two divisions worked jointly to 
monitor the Russian labor market and recommend a list of 1,500 businesses eligible for state aid 
and criteria for this aid to the Finance and Economic Development Ministries.
168
 Both Shuvalov 
and Zhukov are considered key Putin allies: the more liberal Shuvalov was Putin's key economic 
aide in the Kremlin and Russia's Group of Eight Sherpa and is tasked with ―promot[ing] 
economic freedoms and oversee[ing] foreign trade, WTO talks, small business, state property 
and anti-monopoly policy,‖
169
 whereas First Deputy Prime Minister Zhukov retained his current 
position from the Medevdev government. Exemplifying one aspect of the state‘s altered 
approach to economic policy, in October 2008 Shuvalov, speaking to journalists in what he 
promised would be the first in a series of regular state briefings about the financial crisis, 
dismissed rumors that the state was embarking on nationalization projects and promised more 
transparency from the government in the future.
170
 He described the state‘s intent in March 2009 
to focus on stimulating growth through industries other than commodities instead of waiting for 
global oil prices to stabilize, optimistically stating that growth was possible ―even without high 
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prices for oil, metals and gas.‖
171
 In June 2009 he stated that the government ―should behave 
very conservatively‖ regarding the federal budget, and should not revise its figures simply 
because oil prices had grown to $70 per barrel since reaching record lows in 2008.
172
 Shuvalov 
had relatively little visibility in the Putin presidential administration, not appearing as a top 
contender to succeed Putin. One example of his liberal leaning came in 2006, when Shuvalov 
declared that state-controlled Rosneft would be "fully privatized" within the three to ten years, 
contradicting statements by other officials.
173
 In 2008, Shuvalov appeared in a prominent 
position at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, assuring foreign investors of his 
government‘s intention to secure their property rights and scale back the state‘s involvement in 
the economy. In 2009, he chaired a low-level panel at the Forum, while Igor Sechin, associated 
with the siloviki faction, assumed center stage.
174
 Thus, Shuvalov‘s limited presence at the center 
of the crisis management scheme seems to indicate a continuation of the balance Putin seeks to 
strike between liberals and hardliners. When the circumstance requires the espousal of support 
for liberal or free market principles, such as the foreign investor panic in the autumn of 2008, 
officials with corresponding track records surface in support of these goals.  
Finance Minister Kudrin is widely considered one of the main architects of the Russian 
state‘s crisis response. Since the start of the crisis, both Russian and Western media have 
commented on his centrality to the crisis as controller of the Stabilization Fund, a position which 
has embroiled him in politicking between state factions. Kudrin has publicly disagreed with 
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Putin in pre-crisis times: in 2007 he, along with similarly liberal-minded Economic Development 
German Gref, opposed Putin‘s proposal to invest energy revenues in the domestic stock market 
to prop up stagnating stock prices on the grounds that such a move would fuel inflation and 
speculation.
175
 The Financial Times emphasized Kudrin‘s discontent with state intervention 
during the crisis: on the subject of price freezes on basic foods, he stated, ―it sends a wrong 
signal to the market.‖
176
The preservation of a substantial cushion of foreign exchange reserves at 
the conclusion of 2009, however, is evidence of a triumph for Kudrin: he resisted pressure from 
stakeholders in major state-supported enterprises (mostly siloviki) to spend reserves on financing 
the debts of these corporations. Kurdin also faced demands from Vladimir Yakunin, head of 
state-operated Russian Railways and a close colleague of Putin, to institute capital exchange 
controls to stem capital flight.
177
The Kudrin-led policy of gradual devaluation, described in the 
previous chapter, demonstrates that the government did not simply acquiesce to pressures from 
well-connected business elites and government conservatives, instead tempering policy choices 
with options put forth by liberals like Kurdin who were not previously at the heart of domestic 
politicking. In February 2009, Kudrin spearheaded a reversal in anti-crisis policy in conjunction 
with a revision of the 2009 budget to account for falling oil prices: he ended a foreign debt 
refinancing program of Vneshekonombank (VEB), arguing that the commercial banks, fuelled 
with foreign currency from the government‘s devaluation measures should perform this 
function.
178
 Throughout the crisis, Kudrin has taken cautious positions, being the first 
government official to admit mishandling the economy in the pre-crisis period and insisting that 
oil price rebounds should not fuel ―excess appetites.‖ A supporter of stronger links with the 
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West, in the midst of crisis Kudrin stated, ―for the moment, in this global economy our capital 
market is still a weak link…volatility will be felt on our equity markets, in our currency 
exchange rate and in our trade balance,‖ augmenting these remarks in a subsequent presentation 
in the United States by saying the Russian state is conducting economic planning “based on the 
assumption that we must be on guard, facing a long-term siege of negative factors… and expect 
a slow upturn coming out of crisis.‖
179
 Kudrin, who is not affiliated with any political party, also 
criticized Putin‘s United Russia for its ineffective approach to economic policy and actions 
against competitive elections in Russia, adding he was disinterested in joining the party.
180
 
Notably, Kudrin himself hinted at the dependence of economic and political life on Putin, 
remarking, ―only efforts by the government and Putin personally have managed to keep things in 
balance.‖
181
 
Yet discord exists even between Kudrin and Medvedev, two politicians frequently 
thought to be in the same camp. The issue of altering the dollar‘s role as the dominant reserve 
currency of the world indicated one point of disagreement. At a meeting of finance ministers 
from the Group of Eight countries in June 2009, Kudrin noted that the architecture and 
mechanics of global financial system were unlikely to undergo change in the near future, adding 
that Russia would not alter the structure of its reserve funds, given that the dollar was in "good 
shape."
182
 Days later, Medvedev, speaking at Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
summit, took an opposing position, stating that "the incumbent set of reserve currencies and the 
U.S. dollar as the main reserve currency has failed to accomplish their function...we will not be 
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able to do without new reserve currencies."
183
 According to www.polit.ru, a website lauded by 
independent international policy discussion website openDemocracy as hosting high quality and 
unbiased Russian political commentary and daily news, reported Medvedev‘s criticism of a May 
2009 statement made by Kudrin predicting that Russia may not enjoy 2000 – 2004 growth rates 
for up to fifty years.
184
 The clearly opposing views demonstrate divergent interests and roles. 
Kudrin, described by several political analysts as a technocrat known for avoiding politicking 
and focusing on pragmatically addressing economic issues, is not bound by the political liaisons 
and obligations to a broader constituency; it has not been his practice to champion Russia‘s 
infallibility or special identity on the world stage. Medvedev carries a different responsibility as 
president: he must balance special interests and therefore is more likely to make broad-sweeping 
or nationalistic statements.  
Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Sechin oversees the country‘s energy sector and serves 
as Chairman of Rosneft. He is identified in both Western and Russian media as a close associate 
of Putin and the leader of the government hard-line faction comprised of former security services 
officials supporting state intervention and nationalism. In June 2009 Sechin upheld state 
involvement in the country‘s energy sector, asserting that in the future Russian oil and gas firms 
can develop fields independently, without production-sharing agreements with foreign 
firms.
185
There is an abundance of speculation that Kudrin, as the creator of the Stabilization 
Fund that channeled oil export profits away from siloviki associates in big business, is his chief 
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political enemy.
186
 Substantial conservative criticism surrounding Kudrin‘s handling of the crisis 
and devaluation program occurred since August 2008; in February 2009 head of Russian 
Railways Vladimir Yakunin blamed Kudrin for not acting sooner to stem the outflow of foreign 
currency echoed Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov‘s sentiments that Kudrin‘s policy of mentarism 
should be abandoned.
187
 Such outcries may provide a window of opportunity for Sechin to 
launch an attempt to seize power from Kudrin: in February 2009 Aleksander Bastrykin, head of 
the investigative committee of the Prosecutor-General‘s office, accused two top Finance Ministry 
officials of embezzling $18 million, a move interpreted by several Russia experts to be a Sechin-
backed initiative.
188
The fact that Kudrin remained in office at the end of 2009 proves a good 
barometer of the limits to Sechin‘s machinations.  
Analysis 
As Russia‘s economy contracted between August 2008 and December 2009, the complex 
network of patronage and power politics supporting the Putin system of leadership faced new 
iterations of the struggle for political resources. As Ian Bremmer wrote in 2008, ―the siloviki are 
here to stay,‖
189
 deeply ingrained at all levels of the complex bureaucratic fabric including the 
segments responsible for economic policymaking and reform. In 2002, Lilia Shvetsova, a Senior 
Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, identified three criteria that 
allowed Putin to pass structural reforms between 2001 and 2003 and are useful in analyzing the 
current prospects for reform motivated by individual interests. Shvetsova writes that Putin ―had 
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reason to believe that liberalizing the economy would be preferable to the previous status quo 
both for the country and for his personal interest in holding on to power,‖ since the removal of 
structural barriers to economic progress could be used to capture the endorsement of the 
population; he likely calculated that ―he would not lose his power as a result of liberalization;‖ 
finally, ―Putin had at his disposal enough resources to carry out at least part of his economic 
objectives.‖
190
Robinson agrees that the weak position of he Russian state immediately after the 
1998 crisis complicated prospects for reform.
191
 Additionally, this series of reforms came in the 
midst of economic decline, when the Russian populace was weary from a period of instability.  
If one considers the situation today, these same conditions for reform do not exist so 
clearly. In the early period of his presidency, Putin appeased many societal groups, contributing 
to the accumulation of consensus for reform to take hold; I have argued that by 2008 he clearly 
aligned himself with a policy of authoritarianism despite allowing the existence of a liberal 
faction in the political ring. Thus, liberalization did not appear to be on the horizon for the 
country, at least in the short term. Some scholars argue that the particular ruling tandem with 
Medvedev was created specifically for the purpose of creating a mechanism by which Putin 
could reconfigure power arrangements to guarantee his own interests in an evolving world.
192
 
Additionally, the period of instability and social discontent remained mild between August 2008 
and December 2009, owing to a combination of oil price rebounds, political maneuvers and 
government policies limiting the negative impact of the crisis. Making the case for a package of 
substantial changes to the economy was not a primary focus of the state during this period, and 
would be difficult to accomplish given the lack of extensive dissatisfaction with the government 
management of the economy and a clear scapegoat or program to rally both elite and popular 
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support against. More generally, anti-crisis measures seemed geared towards preserving the 
status quo rather than exploiting change.  
Several points and conclusions may be derived from the analysis of the impact of the 
domestic federal political system on the determination of the crisis response program and the 
prospects for reform. First, the system comprises a multitude of actors, each with preferences 
that are difficult to definitively categorize into pro- or counter- pre-crisis economic policy. Most 
of these actors operate within complex relationship networks that support Putin‘s continued 
power. It is impossible to definitively trace and understand who influences which economic 
policy, as most decisions are made behind closed doors without media access. Thus, scholars and 
analysts of Russia‘s politics largely speculate on the impact of personal interests and ideologies 
on the very processes this thesis seeks to analyze. Nevertheless, based on the assumptions made 
above, it has been difficult for liberal-minded individuals to break through the stronghold of 
Putin-supported individuals favoring state intervention and nationalism, especially as the most 
acute adverse effects of the crisis have shown signs of subsiding and pre-crisis policies appear 
workable to a ruling elite seeking to maintain its power. If the crisis persisted, previous policies, 
for example, tolerance of opaque operations of state-supported corporations and prior levels of 
spending on inefficient social programs, would appear increasingly discredited in the eyes of the 
ruling elite. I argue that in this case, and over the course of such a condensed time horizon, only 
acquiescence by Putin and his closest allies would truly permit a vast liberalization of policies in 
line with the ideas of Kudrin, Gref and, to some extent, Medvedev. This is consistent with the 
previously described view that change in Russia ultimately occurs from above, not from popular 
pressures. Igor Yurgens, head of the liberal Institute of Contemporary Development, succinctly 
reduces the future of domestic politics to a single variable: ―The role of Vladimir Putin will be 
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what he sees for himself.‖
193
 Of course, there is likely a tipping point, characterized by political 
failure and a favorable concatenation of events, which could motivate change; however, it did 
not occur in the period under assessment. That having been said, Putin and other individuals 
operate within an evolving system, what some have deemed an ―overmanaged democracy,‖ 
which depends entirely on ―leadership popularity and the actual capacity, the talent, of the 
leadership in actually exercising this manual control of the system in a competent way.‖
194
 
Though this system seems to have held up between August 2008 and December 2009, future 
crises may affect it in unpredictable ways.  
Nevertheless, it is useful to investigate Russia‘s prior crisis experience to determine how 
certain features, including the domestic political landscape, interact to shape the evolution of 
economic policy. Based on the relative influence of internal versus external catalysts, state 
capacity, and other societal features conclusions regarding the feasibility of certain state policies 
in 2010 and beyond may be drawn. A treatment of the lasting impact of the 1998 crisis on the 
Russian population, leadership and economy cannot be excluded from this analysis, for it is the 
low point many Russians employ as a benchmark of utter economic collapse and political, as 
well as social, calamity. Given that Russia spent nearly a decade attempting to shield itself from 
another disaster based on its experience in 1998, the fact that the 2008 crisis occurred at what 
had been perceived as a high point in economic success and future development demonstrates the 
drawbacks of the Putin approach and invites the question of how the years following this crisis 
may be used in for the aims of economic development.   
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COMPARISON WITH THE 1998 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 Russia‘s development in the past three decades has occurred within a cycle of crisis and 
stability. The most recent destabilization occurred in 1998 following policy failures and fruitless 
reform efforts during the Yeltsin years (1990s); its unfolding reflected mismanagement of the 
opening of the country's financial markets to foreign lenders and investors. The country became 
vulnerable to the risk of domestic financial difficulties evolving into currency crisis. Indeed, 
when major capital outflows began in the summer of 1998, the government devalued the ruble, 
leading to unhedged currency exposures, soaring interest rates, and mass bankruptcies. This 
interaction of internal and external circumstances in the case of Russia shared features with 
economic crises in other emerging markets during the late 1990s. 
 The financial crisis beginning in August 1998 is widely seen as having reshaped the 
country‘s political economy, as well as its relationship with the global economy.
195
 In its wake, 
the state introduced some medium-term structural reforms, including the introduction of a flat tax 
rate and alterations to tax collection, as well as market-oriented policies. Nearly ten years later, a 
crisis particularly reminiscent of the meltdown in 1998 hit Russia, inviting a comparison of the 
origins, nature, and consequences of the two events to shed light on the implications of the 2008 
economic crisis on the economic policy agenda of the Russian state today.  
 
Similarities 
 Western analysts referred to the economic, social and political developments in Russia 
between 1995 and 1998 as an example of a successful transition from authoritarianism and a 
closed economy to a market-oriented democracy. The country experienced profound changes and 
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appeared to be on an upward trajectory before the summer of 1998. Similarly, the eight years 
between 2000 and 2008 comprised the most astonishing, fast and geographically-widespread 
economic growth in Russia‘s history, characterized by a thriving stock market and a burgeoning 
middle class. Commodities exports played a crucial role in the economy prior to the crisis in 
1998: oil and gas accounted for almost half of Russia's export revenues and directly for one-fifth 
of federal government revenues.
196
 The share of oil and gas in export receipts had reached 68 
percent in the beginning of 2008, and natural resources directly accounted for half of federal 
government revenues.
197
 After the development of rapid growth and asset booms, both cases 
experienced ―default, devaluation and despair.‖
198
  
 
Differences 
 At the beginning of the twenty-first century Russia expressed a confident geopolitical 
stature, motivated in large part by an economy exceedingly more robust than that of the mid-
1990s. Then, it had already experienced severe economic difficulty following the failed market 
reform experiments made by Yeltsin and Gaidar in the 1990s, which impoverished the  
population. Though disagreement exists over the culpability of the Russian state itself in 
promoting recession,
 199
 the crisis of 1998 marked the first true instance when Russia was 
subjected to negative impacts caused by its interaction in international economic processes. The 
resulting meltdown reverberated to the political and social spheres, knocking down the 
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―imitation of capitalism‖
 200
 that had given rise to an unsustainable division of economic rents 
among the state, the private sector, average citizens and a virtual economy. The subsequent void 
of a well-defined relationship between the state, the economy and society permitted Putin to 
develop his social contract based on a combination of sovereignty and prosperity. Russian and 
Western media agree that the economic crisis of 2008 had truly global origins of an 
unprecedented magnitude and thus differed significantly from its predecessor.   
  The 1998 and 2008 crises differ in several respects, including their origins, the sectoral 
linkages in existence during their progression, and the sequencing of their spread to various 
sectors of the economy. Owing to the growing dominance of natural resources in the economy 
since 1998, vulnerability to global commodity prices played a more prominent role in the origins 
of the 2008 crisis. According to some estimates, the overall direct share of natural resources and 
related sectors in the economy's total value added increased from about 15 percent in 1997 to 
about 20 percent in 2007.
201
 In 1998, the Russian banking system remained immature and mainly 
limited in interaction with large institutional actors; credit to the private sector totaled only 9 
percent of GDP.
202
 Bankruptcies in the financial sector, therefore, had limited repercussions in 
the real sector (encompassing economic activities related to aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply) , which is predominantly influenced by the activities of consumers and industry. The 
nascent middle class shouldered the majority of the negative impact of the crisis, a dynamic to 
which the government‘s decision to devaluate the ruble contributed since the price of food and 
consumer goods rose sharply and this income segment had constituted the majority of consumers 
of these goods. The expanded lower class vocalized its discontent with the state and held onto its 
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savings, opting not to put them back into formal banking institutions.
203
  In 2008, all three 
sectors of the economy (real, government and financial) were hit simultaneously, whereas 
previously the financial and banking crises were layered on top of existing problems in the real 
sector.
204
 Additionally, Russia‘s financial sector had evolved: in 2007, domestic credit to the 
private sector had reached 42 percent of GDP, about one-quarter of which was granted to 
consumers. External borrowing became a widespread practice, financing loan-to-deposit ratios of 
150 percent.
205
 
 
Size and power of government 
 The potency and magnitude of the 2008 crisis revealed coordination problems within the 
regime, as the official state position on the economy was reformulated from denial to acceptance; 
yet, despite the results of a January 2009 poll conducted by the Levada Center, an independent 
think tank, revealing that a majority of Russians doubted their government could effectively 
handle the crisis, Putin‘s and Medvedev‘s approval ratings remain well above 65 percent (78 
percent in August 2009).
206
 As indicated in previous chapters of this thesis, the strength of the 
post-Communist Russian state rose to its highest level prior to the downturn of 2008, 
differentiating the pre-crisis position from that which existed in 1998. The power of the state 
appears in two dimensions, ideological and financial. As Andrew Wilson notes, ―the Putin 
regime has successfully mythologised 1998 as a crisis of statehood and therefore argues that 
preserving hard-won stability is the only way to prevent a reversal through 1998 back to the 
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social chaos of the 1990s.‖
207
 This notion of the necessity of absolute sovereignty rationalizes a 
multitude of actions taken by Putin and other officials, for example, the practice of accumulating 
foreign exchange surpluses and maintaining prudent federal budgetary surpluses. Practically, this 
means the state has more room for fiscal stimulus than it did in 1998, when general government 
revenues accounted for only about 27 percent of GDP , with federal revenues accounting for less 
than half of this sum (in 2007 the federal budget surplus was 5.5% of GDP).
208
 Both these 
factors, stimulated by lessons learned from the 1998 meltdown regarding the destabilizing effects 
of a hungry and impoverished populace, contributed to an emphasis by Putin and Medvedev on 
limiting adverse effects of the crisis on the wallets and psyches of Russians. 
 
Reform 
 In the case of Russia, the effect of crisis on the reform agenda is mixed and therefore 
difficult to extrapolate to the 2008-2009 situation. Some scholars argue that post-crisis 
stabilization and growth at the end of the 1990s and through the early 2000s were not created ―by 
some corrective effect of crisis‖ which taught policymakers explicit lessons on how to manage 
economic affairs and stimulated coordinated reform efforts,
209
 but rather through a piecemeal 
approach and factors not tied to policy. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss credits post-1998 recovery to three 
factors: an increase in domestic consumer demand due to the low value of the ruble and high cost 
of imports, the rise in world oil prices which grew consumer income and made exports 
eventually more affordable, and Prime Minister Primakov‘s disciplined fiscal policy.
210
 Scholars 
who apportion a small part of the credit for recovery to the government also cite the development 
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of a virtual economy saturated with corruption and a broad reconfiguration of the state‘s 
relationship to the economy that Putin exploited and shaped, but never developed into a coherent 
economic plan.
211
 Some reforms in the financial sector and in terms of free markets, trade 
integration, and enterprise privatization and restructuring were reversed in the post-crisis 
period.
212
 Other, medium-term initiatives were promoted, including restructuring of the 
electricity sector, tax reform, introduction of deposit insurance, and pension reform.
213
 Based on 
the cumulative government response and recovery prospects at the end of 2009, green shoots of 
reform have been overshadowed in large part by a temptation for administrative (non-market) 
measures, such as state support for the auto industry.  
 
Analysis 
 Each crisis has shown that Russia is becoming increasingly embedded in the international 
economy; the economic situation today has highlighted a new set of challenges for the country. 
To what extent are the country‘s difficulties imposed upon it by the dictates of the global system, 
and what share of the accountability lies with the policies of the state? The lessons of 1998, as 
well as the Putin regime‘s own conceptions of sovereignty and prosperity shape the state‘s 
interpretations of this dynamic and its translation into policy. If the fundamental interests of the 
regime have been threatened, then Putin will seek to preserve his power and eradicate the sources 
of problem. For at least a period of one year the government demonstrated increased 
attentiveness to global processes and the country endured a period of instability at the hand of 
volatile oil prices, fluctuations in foreign stock markets, and other events. Assuming that the 
Russian state always wishes to maintain its power and achieve maximum political and social 
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stability, including in the post-1998 period, Putin and Medvedev will each also do so today, 
bolstered by the reality that they have the sufficient political capital, popular approval and 
financial resources to do so. Of course, the analysis is complicated by the reality that Putin and 
Medvedev may in fact be pursuing either complementary or disharmonious goals – the 
opaqueness of much of the Russian political mechanism leaves this an open question regularly 
debated by top scholars and experts. Additionally, the domestic political landscape in 2008 is 
generally characterized by two factions, one largely promoting maintenance of the status quo and 
the other supporting reform, whereas post-1998 the power vacuum was not characterized by a 
similarly well-defined and supported tension. However, combining the objective of power 
maintenance with the presumption that Putin maintains a monopoly over Russia‘s political 
resources once again supports the interpretation that the focus has been on responding to the 
crisis in a manner that most closely preserves the pre-existing order, instead of one which 
genuinely seeks to address systemic challenges exposed by the crisis and which may prove to be 
politically destabilizing if addressed.    
   
CONCLUSION 
 
 The 2008 economic crisis, together with the ongoing recovery period, represents a critical 
juncture in Russia‘s economic, political and social development. The economic turmoil brought 
new challenges to the political establishment and initiated a vigorous period of debate and 
dialogue surrounding issues including diversification away from dependence on commodities 
exports, modernization, the state as an actor in economic affairs, and globalization. The crisis 
experience may precede far-reaching alterations in the relationship of the state to the economy or 
to its people, or, conversely, might be viewed in hindsight as a missed window of opportunity 
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ushering in stagnation or a reversal in fortune. This thesis determined that the 2008 economic 
crisis acted as an independent variable through several channels to considerably influence the 
economic policy of the Russian state. By damaging stock markets, federal budgets, and foreign 
exchange reserves, the crisis rendered the previous approach to economic management untenable 
given Russia‘s existing institutions and resources. As a result of its impact on wages and 
unemployment, exacerbated by limited government financial resources, the crisis ignited 
demands for greater welfare support to Russian citizens, in turn inciting a variety of populist 
measures aimed at assuaging these tensions. Confronting a multitude of negative implications of 
crisis, the Russian state faced policy constraints on many dimensions between August 2008 and 
December 2009. In the period examined, the dedicated responses to conditions created by crisis 
were not treated in a coherent fashion by the state; statements on the importance of further 
reform and on cooperation with other countries clashed with attempts to preserve existing power 
structures and control over big business.  
The crisis laid bare significant weaknesses in the country‘s approach to economic 
development and its role in politics and society. A heavy reliance on commodities exports for 
sustaining rapid GDP and income growth paired with vastly insufficient investment into 
alleviation of the country‘s biggest hurdles to economic growth (investment climate, education, 
health, rule of law) represent the two major pillars of the Putin-led system in place prior to the 
crisis; in 2010, they remain largely intact. The provision of strong macroeconomic growth during 
an era of high oil prices and a favorable global economic environment served as an essential 
element in Putin‘s social contract with the Russian population and, by extension, in his formula 
for retaining political power. The 2008 crisis, global in nature and external in origin, introduced 
disruptions to the equation that must be addressed by Russia‘s chief decision maker in order to 
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support his personal interests. Though this thesis has not ventured into the realm of predicting 
which scenario will occur, broadly speaking two options appear possible: either Putin will retain 
the main features of existing state controls in the economy and authoritarianism (referred to by 
others as ―illiberal internationalism‖ and an ―overmanaged democracy‖), attempting to tweak it 
on the margins to endure the strains placed upon it by the crisis, or he will permit a dismantling 
of the system in favor of one more transparent and open to the global economy. The latter option 
would require reform across a number of dimensions, including technological know-how, 
enforcement of property rights, and privatization.  
In the first section of analysis, this thesis demonstrated that the Russian state directly 
responded to external events occurring as part of the global crisis; most, if not all, of these 
policies would not have been pursued in the absence of catalysts like those imposed by the crisis, 
since they did not promote Putin‘s objectives of maintaining political power and stability. 
Massive liquidity injections, gradual devaluation of the ruble, a revision of the federal budget 
based on projections of lower global oil prices, and bailouts to state-supported banks and 
corporations are all examples of measures taken directly in response to these aspects of the crisis. 
The analysis found that as time progressed and the length of the downturn and global oil prices 
became more uncertain, state actions incorporated the global recovery to a greater degree; for 
instance, substantial changes to the federal budget and anti-crisis policy appeared only after 
months of very low economic indicators. On the whole, however, the state lacked a coherent, 
well-defined anti-crisis and future development plan.  
This thesis concludes that the absence of such a plan and the ad hoc nature of the 
government response reflect wider problems endemic to Russia: while global recovery may 
alleviate the sharpest economic pains currently facing the country, it will not itself solve the 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
84 
fundamental challenges impeding Russia‘s development. Weak institutions for investment, the 
lack of programs aimed at igniting engines of economic growth outside the commodities sector, 
and an oversized and inefficient state sector constitute three paramount challenges confronting 
the Russian leadership. This thesis found no support for the notion that Russian economic crises 
necessarily spur reform; indeed the analysis strengthens the notion that the government may be 
seeking to construct piecemeal anti-crisis measures while resisting the need for broader structural 
reform. Modernization has become the dominant buzzword in the Russian public discourse: 
Medvedev has championed the need to diversify the economy, boost technological innovation 
and develop the private sector, yet the process of doing so remains a subject of debate. The 
issues Russia is facing lie at the heart of development studies: what is the proper sequencing of 
such reforms, and to what degree should the state guide them? Tight state control, used in the 
Chinese model, can arguably lead to a modern free market economy as well as a democratic, 
private sector-led approach. 
Questions remain regarding the need for Russia to attain democratization in advance of 
modernization, and the willingness of the state to permit this development. This thesis touched 
on these issues, revealing that the threat of growing popular discontent motivated a state policy 
of a dual nature: highly publicized instances showcasing a populist-friendly side of the state and 
its ability to protect Russian from the crisis progressed in tandem with the continuation of Putin‘s 
pre-crisis balancing of oligarchs and other elite interests through financial support. The economic 
crisis, then, may be understood as imposing constraints on the ease with which Putin and others 
could do so, particularly since demands for state support increased as corporations and banks 
faced trouble rolling over debts denominated in foreign currency. The uprising of Pikalevo 
serves as the most illustrative example of the state‘s increasing alertness to sources of potential 
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social disruption, a consciousness likely stemming from a lack of experience with similar 
incidences in the past eight years. Nevertheless, between August 2008 and December 2009 Putin 
retained his preferred method of state control over big business while providing isolated and 
targeted support to those deemed most worthy. Given the necessity of institutional and economic 
reforms, Putin‘s case-by-case approach to local problems and bailouts (at least in the earlier 
stages of crisis) indicates a postponement of a decision on how to approach the long-term 
obstacles. This makes sense, since increasing transparency and the potency of democratic 
processes underpins or supports a majority of the reform agenda and thereby inherently loosens 
Putin‘s grasp on power. Delays in addressing the root causes of the crisis‘ severe impact on 
Russia may lead to the growth of social problems, reversing the political apathy of Russians and 
increasing the sense of threat felt by the regime. Future developments will contribute to research 
seeking to describe the thresholds beyond which popular discontent forms into coherent political 
opposition, a dynamic that has not yet crystallized to incite upheaval of the Russian leadership. 
At the present moment, Russians appear to back the state and attribute the detrimental impacts of 
the crisis on exogenous forces. Later on, however, if the public determines policy errors or lack 
of reform to have caused crisis, there is a chance that the state will pursue vastly different, and 
likely more liberal, growth policies as a result.   
The analysis confirmed the continued importance of individuals and political networks in 
the formulation of economic policy. The economic crisis threatened the legitimacy of Putin and 
his inner circle as the mechanism supported by this group permitted the transmission of the crisis 
to Russia. Conversely, a more realistic opportunity emerged for liberals to advance their agenda. 
Yet by the end of 2009 these interests had failed to materialize into notable policy changes as the 
ruling elite has been successful in staving off severe recession, due to a combination of prudent 
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fiscal management and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, appropriate short-term 
responses to the crisis, and the barely perceptible prospects of growth on the horizon at the end 
of 2009. This confluence of events made pre-crisis policies, as well as the measures taken during 
the crisis, most of which did not differ substantially from the pre-crisis state, appear workable to 
a ruling elite seeking to maintain its power. Masha Lipman, a political analyst at the Carnegie 
Moscow Center, notes that any necessary economic reforms imply ―relinquishing power and 
reducing the role of the state‖ which would ―undermine the position of the current decision 
makers. So the preservation of the status quo is higher on their list of priorities than making 
Russia a more prosperous economy.‖
214
 This suggests that to the Russian state, the current period 
represents simply a new iteration of the previous economic environment – one in which the 
tantamount goal of preserving the power of the ruling elite is achieved with new mechanisms. 
Without true political competition, the goal of modernization may not be achieved without 
wasted resources. 
Memories of the 1998 financial crisis in Russia reentered the public and state 
consciousness and influenced economic policy decisions during the 2008 crisis. Beginning in 
2000, at the start of Putin‘s presidency, lessons from the chaotic and impoverished 1990s and a 
desire to avoid recession like the one in 1999 motivated Putin to prioritize the avoidance of 
federal budget deficits and the pursuit of some structural reforms in the first half of his tenure as 
president. Yet despite his emphasis on financial sovereignty and a strong state, Putin‘s 
mechanism for ruling the economy and the country proved ineffective in preventing a 
devastating crisis in 2008. This thesis compared the origins, nature and impact of the two crises 
to find that in many respects, Russia‘s condition between August 2008 and December 2009 was 
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not all that different from the post-1998 scenario. Putin‘s brand of authoritarianism neglected the 
same maladies that held back the country earlier; today, however, the global nature of crisis has 
led some to predict a far more challenging recovery.  In contrast to the frequent turnover of 
Prime Ministers and glimmers of democracy under Boris Yeltsin, Putin enjoys high approval 
ratings and an unprecedented degree of centralized control over the political resources of the 
country. The modest rollbacks of democracy correlated with the achievement of financial and 
political sovereignty and high growth rates accumulated to yield a high degree of 
authoritarianism that has allowed Putin the latitude to contemplate an approach to future 
economic development without putting forth a concrete plan. Yet with time the connections 
between the severity of the crisis in Russia to the corruption, absence of property rights and rule 
of law, and infrastructure deterioration may become more evident to a larger number of 
Russians, prompting them to voice their discontent on a large scale and making avoidance of 
these issues impossible for the state.  
Authoritarianism and the high degree of state involvement in economic affairs were 
merely correlated with the high growth rates of the past decade; indeed, there is no conclusive 
evidence that authoritarian states automatically deliver this success or can sustain it in the long 
run. Yet the critical juncture at which this claim is tested may be just beginning for Russia: 
today‘s public discourse and small sparks of social discontent may precede a more substantial 
reevaluation of the social contract and development track. In early 2010 the Institute of 
Contemporary Development (INSOR), a think tank created by Medvedev for consultation on 
economic policy and modernization, released a report entitled "21st Century Russia: the Image 
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of the Tomorrow We Want" which advances the view that Russia is at a crossroads in its history 
confronting a choice between modernization or an demotion of its status on the world stage.
215
 
To what extent are the process and components of modernization dictated by the realities 
of contemporary global economic integration? At a basic level, this thesis has shown how 
external factors fuelling the 2008 economic crisis constrained the policy choices of the Russian 
state, forcing alterations of financial and social measures to accommodate the alterations 
resulting in the domestic economy. The state was unable to maintain previous levels of financial 
resources and security, leading to revisions in how funds were allocated among societal groups. 
The tradeoff of remaining linked to international financial markets and the wider global economy 
were thus increasing humility and conservatism in economic policy (the revision of the federal 
budget, heightened dialogue on cleaning up and strengthening the financial sector) and an 
increase in measures aimed at addressing the cost of global economic integration to social 
welfare.  
As economists have noted for over a decade, extensive willingness by states to participate 
in a system characterized by highly volatile international capital flows defines the present-day 
international economy. Despite the severe costs capital flight has imposed in all major financial 
crises since the 1970s, states have not yet abandoned the current architecture, though the 2008 
crisis may prompt a reinvention in future years. Thus, if the Kremlin wishes to continue to reap 
the benefits foreign investment can bring, it must formulate a sustainable arrangement addressing 
both the social welfare needs of its population and the requirements for successful existence in 
the global economy. As this thesis demonstrated, many of these requirements relate to Russia‘s 
institutional framework, whose deficiencies permitted domestic transmission of the crisis. If 
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nothing else, the crisis has posed a stark challenge to Putin‘s system of delivering prosperity and 
ensuring sovereignty, prompting a reexamination of some of its basic tenets. Predicting what this 
reexamination, which is occurring internal to the Russian state, will yield was not a subject of 
this thesis. There are several potential models for economic development, each carrying its own 
merits and drawbacks. On the dimension of interaction with other states, there are two options. 
The first is a movement towards international cooperation to revise the global financial and 
economic framework, which may be termed mutual insurance against the inherent instability of 
the global system. Self-insurance, that is, attempting to build resilience to volatility through 
accumulation of foreign currency reserves, regulation, protectionism, or other measures, is the 
second option. Putin attempted to develop the Russian economy by the latter approach until 
2008. The evolution of the Russian state‘s attitude towards multilateral discussions on global 
recovery between August 2008 and the end of 2009 indicates an awareness of the need to alter 
the aggressive geopolitical stance of the recent past. Putin and Medvedev certainly continue to 
seek a way of elevating Russia‘s stature and power on the world stage, but the ruinous effects of 
the crisis have significantly discredited their brand of economic management. Attempts to lead 
discussions on the international monetary regime have been balanced by a stated desire to 
cooperate with other nations. Thus, regardless of whether the country will pursue an evolution of 
the status quo or attempt to deeply root modernization, sole reliance on global commodities 
prices as before is no longer viable option for the long term. 
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APPENDIX A: Russian economic boom, 1999 – 2008  
 
GDP growth (percent year on year), 2000 – 2008  
 
 
 
 
 
GDP growth in current US dollars, 1999 – 2008  
 
 
 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
91 
 
Source: http://russiablog.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
92 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
―2009 budget should not be reviewed despite oil price growth – Shuvalov.‖ RIA Novosti. June 6, 2009. 
Alexandrova, Lyudmila. ―Inter-party quarrel ends in non-aggression pact.‖ ITAR-TASS. February 29, 
2010. 
 
Aron, Leon. ―Putin‘s Risks.‖ American Enterprise Institute Outlook Series.  
 
Aron, Leon. ―Samizdat in the 21
st
 Century.‖ Foreign Policy Online. July/August 2009. 
 
Aslund, Anders. An Assessment of Putin’s Economic Policy. The Peterson Institute of Internaitonal 
Economics. Article published in CESifo Forum, February 2008. 
 
Aslund, Anders. ―Combatting Inflation with WTO Membership.‖ The St. Petersburg Times. November 6, 
2007.  
 
Aslund, Anders. ―Putinomics.‖ Op-ed distributed through Project Syndicate. December 3, 2007. 
 
Aslund, Anders. Russia’s Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed. 
Peterson Institute of International Economics. October 2007. P 234.  
 
Aslund, Anders and Peter Kuchins. The Russia Balance Sheet. Peter G. Peterson Institute for International 
Economic and the Center for Strategic International Studies. 2009. P 40 
Aslund, Anders. ―Russia‘s Economic Mess.‖ The Moscow Times. July 30, 2009. 
 
Aslund, Anders. ―The End Seems Near for the Putin Model.‖ The Washington Post. February 26, 2010. 
 
Aslund, Anders. ―WTO Can Place Russia on the Right Track.‖ The Moscow Times. July 31, 2008.  
 
Badovsky, Dmitry. “Russia‘s Modernization: At Another Fork in the Road.‖ Russia in Global Affairs, 
Vol. 3. July – September 2009. 
Baev, Pavel. ―Putin Opts for a Large Deficit and Small Investment 2010 Budget.‖ Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
Volume: 6 Issue: 148. Jamestown Foundation. August 3, 2009. 
 
Barry, Ellen. ―World Bank Grim on Russian Economy. The New York Times. March 30, 2009. 
 
Belton, Catherine. ―Medvedev orders probe into state companies.‖ The Financial Times. August 7, 2009.  
Berglöf, Erik Alexander Plekhanov, and Alan Rousso. ―A Tale of Two Crises.‖ Finance & Development. 
The International Monetary Fund. June 2009. 
Berglof, Eric and A. Lehmann. ―Sustaining Russia‘s Growth: The Role of Financial Reform,‖ Journal of 
Comparative Economics, Volume 37, Issue 2, June 2009, P 198-206.  
 
Bigg, Claire. ―Protests across Russia force Putin to double increase in pension payments.‖ The Guardian. 
January 19, 2005.  
 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
93 
Blomfield, Adrian. ―Vladimir Putin humiliates Russian supermarket chiefs over expensive sausages.‖ The 
Telegraph. June 25, 2009. 
Bogetic, Zieljko. ―Anatomy of Russia‘s Financial Crisis.‖ World Bank Quarterly Monitor No. 15, 
October – December 2008. 
Bogetic, Zeljko .―Global Crisis and Its Impacts on Russia: Refocusing Policy on Households.‖ 
International Economic Bulletin. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April 2009.  
 
Bogetic, Zeljko. “Russia: Recent Economic Developments and Medium-Term Prospects.‖ March 31, 
2008. Moscow. 
 
Bransten, Jeremy. ―Russia: Putin Calls for Growth, Bolder Economic Vision.‖ Center for Defense 
Information Russia Weekly # 201. April 12, 2001. 
 
Bremmer, Ian and Samuel Charap, ―The Siloviki: Who Are They and What Do They Want?‖ The 
Washington Quarterly, 30:1. Winter 2006-2007. 
 
Bryanski, Gleb. ―Kudrin says budget revision difficult.‖ Reuters. February 16, 2009. 
 
Buckley, Neil. ―Alexei Kudrin: A guarantor of fiscal discipline.‖ The Financial Times. April 17, 2008. 
 
Caceres, Carlos and Eric Chaney. ―Risk of Recession Rising.‖ Morgan Stanley Global Economic Forum. 
July 31, 2008. 
 
Capoccia, Giovanni and R. Daniel Kelemen. ―The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative and 
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism.‖ World Politics 59, April 2007. P 347 
 
Champion, Marc. ―Russia, China Blame Woes on Capitalism.‖ The New York Times. January 29, 2009. 
 
Clover, Charles. ―Russian one-company towns face decline.‖ The Financial Times. October 27, 2009. 
 
Cooper, William. ―Russia‘s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United 
States.‖ Congressional Research Service. Report for Congress, RL 34512. 
 
Dvorkovich, Arkady. ―Modernizing Russia Through Innovation.‖ The Huffington Post. February 8, 2010. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry. ―One Economy, Ready or Not: Thomas Friedman‘s Jaunt Through Globalization.‖ 
Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999.  
 
Faulconbridge, Guy. ―Putin to defend handling of Russian crisis.‖ Reuters. April 5, 2009.  
 
Filatova, Irina. ―Putin Thanks Party, Sets Priorities for 2010.‖ The Moscow Times. November 23, 2009. 
 
―Fitch Upgrades Russia Outlook to Stable.‖ BusinessWeek. January 22, 2010.  
 
Friedman, Thomas. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York, NY. Anchor Books, 1999. P 110. 
 
Gaddy Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes. ―Putin's Third Way.‖ The National Interest. January 21, 2009. 
 
Gaddy, Clifford and Andrew Kuchins. ―Putin‘s Plan.‖Washington Quarterly, Volume 31, Number 2, 
Spring 2008. P 117-129.  
 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
94 
Gaddy, Clifford . Russia’s Economic Policy at a Crossroads. The Brookings Institution. February 18, 
2009. 
 
Garrett, Geoffrey. ―Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?‖ 
International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and 
Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Autumn, 1998), P. 787-824 
 
Goodrich, Lauren and Peter Zeihan. ―The Financial Crisis and the Six Pillars of Russian Strength.‖ 
STRATFOR Global Intelligence. March 3, 2009. 
 
Greene, Sam. ―Domesticating Russia‘s Economic Crisis.‖ International Economic Bulletin, June 2009. 
 
Greene, Sam. Eyes Wide Shut: The Social Consequences of Russia’s Economic Crisis. The Carnegie 
Moscow Center Briefing, Vol. 10 Issue 4. December 2008. 
 
Gutterman, Steve. ―Russia to push for reform at the G20 summit.‖ The Toronto Star. September 17, 2009. 
 
Halliwell, Steven. ―Russia and the Global Crisis: Consequences of Delayed Reform.‖ Strategic Asia 
2009–10: Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical Stability. National Bureau of Asian Research: 2009. 
 
Horvath, Robert. ―The end of the Putin Era?‖ Inside Story. April 15, 2009. 
 
Iosebashvili, Ira.―High Inflation Raises Specter of Unrest.‖ The Moscow Times. March 18, 2009. 
 
―Is Russia‘s Social Contract Breaking Down?‖ Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. December 26, 2008. 
 
Korchagina, Valeria. ―Shuvalov Says State Will Sell Off Rosneft.‖ The Moscow Times. September 18, 
2006.  
 
Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff and Shang-Jin Wei. ―Financial Globalization: A 
Reappraisal.‖ August 2006. IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 56(1), P 8-62 
 
Kramer, Andrew. ―Medvedev Calls Dollar Unsuitable as a Reserve Currency.‖ The New York Times. June 
5, 2009.  
 
Kramer, Andrew. ―Russia Recalibrates after Commodities Downturn.‖ The New York Times. March 23, 
2009. 
Krastev, Ivan. ―The Rules of Survival.‖ Reading Russia, Volume 20, no. 2. April 2009. 
Kuchins, Andrew. Alternative Futures for Russia to 2017. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
December 2007. 
 
Kuchins, Andrew. Economic Whiplash in Russia. Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 
19, 2009.  
 
Lesova, Polya. ―Putin proposes state investment in domestic stocks.‖ MarketWatch. May 22, 2007. 
 
Levkin, Evgeny,―Slump and the city: Company towns and the crisis in Russia.‖ Development & 
Transition: The Regional Impact of the Global Economic Crisis. 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
95 
 
Levitov, Maria. ―Putin Makes Medvedev Suffer Russian Inflation Jolt.‖ Bloomberg Online. February 28, 
2008. 
 
Mau, Vladimir .―The Global Crisis As Seen from Russia.‖ Russia in Global Affairs¸vol. 1, January – 
March 2009. 
 
McFaul, Michael and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss. ―The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin's 
Crackdown Holds Russia Back.‖  Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008. 
 
―Medvedev Clings to Advancing the Ruble as Reserve Currency.‖ Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 6, Issue 
123. Jamestown Foundation. June 26, 2009. 
 
Mulders, Joera. “Pavlovsky Talks about Putin-Medvedev Relationship.‖ Russia: Other Points of View 
Blog. 
 
Nicholson, Alex and Stephen Bierman, ―Kudrin Sees Russian Oil Price Averaging $50 a Barrel in 2009.‖ 
Bloomberg. November 12, 2008. 
 
Nikitin, Vladimir. ―Russia‘s Crisis Unmasks Putin‘s Flimsy Foundations.‖ Foreign Policy Blogs Network. 
The Foreign Policy Association. January 31, 2009. 
 
Oliphant, Roland. ―Somewhere Over the Rainbow.‖ Russia Profile. February 4, 2010. 
 
Osipovich, Alexander. ― Top official says Russian energy firms can go it alone.‖ The Sydney Morning 
Herald. June 20, 2009.   
 
Petrov, Nikolai and Henry Hale. ―Overmanaged Democracy in Russia: The Ruling Tandem and the 
Economic Crisis.‖ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. September 30, 2009. 
 
Pitlik, Hans and S. Wirth. ―Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization?‖ European Journal  
 
―Prospects for the Global Economy: Recent Developments.‖ The World Bank – Global Development 
Finance 2009: Europe and Central Asia. June 22, 2009. 
 
―Putin and his men steal show at Russia business forum.‖ Reuters. June 6, 2009.  
 
Putin, Vladimir. Speech at United Russia‘s 10
th
 Party Congress. The School of Russian and Asian Studies. 
November 20, 2008.  
 
Robinson, Neil. ―After 1998: State and Economy in Russia at a Time of Resource Abundance.‖ Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and 
Convention Center. March 22, 2006. 
 
Robinson, Neil. ―The global economy, reform and crisis in Russia.‖ Review of International Political 
Economy 6:4 Winter 1999. Pages 531-564 
 
Rodrik, Dani. One Economics, Many Recipes. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 2007. 
 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
96 
Rutland, Peter. ―The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Russia.‖ Russian Analytical Digest, No. 48. 
October 17, 2008. 
 
―Russia and the Financial Crisis: Competing economic policies strain political unity.‖ Strategic 
Comments. Volume 15, Issue 3 May 2009. P 1-2. 
 
―Russia and the Financial Crisis.‖ The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) Russia. 
June 15, 2009.  
 
Russia in the 21
st
 Century: Vision for the Future. INSOR Russia: Institute of Contemporary Development. 
February 18, 2010. 
 
―Russia in the financial crisis and beyond.‖ Deutsche Bank Research. December 11, 2009.  
 
Russian Economic Report. The World Bank Moscow Office – Economic Unit. January 2002. 
 
―Russians fear economic crisis more than democratic freedom restrictions –poll.‖ Interfax. January 23, 
2009. 
 “Russia Promises Auto Aid -- Kremlin Pledges Over $1 Billion in Bid to Avoid Layoffs.‖ Wall Street 
Journal. March 31, 2009.  
 
―Russia‘s Road Back.‖ Interview with Anders Aslund. Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
April 22, 2009.   
 
Ryzhkov, Viktor. ―Sovereignty vs. Democracy?‖ Russia in Global Affairs. Volume 4, October – 
December 2005. 
 
Saunders, Paul. ―Why ‗Globalization‘ Didn‘t Rescue Russia.‖ Policy Review, Hoover Institution, Stanford 
University. February & March 2001.  
 
Schneider, Eberhard. ―Split in the Russian Political Tandem Putin-Medvedev?‖ Caucasian Review of 
International Affairs¸Vol. 3 (2), Spring 2009.  
 
Schwirtz, Michael and Clifford Levy, ―As Economy Sinks, Russians Protest.‖ The New York Times. 
January 31, 2009.  
 
Sestanovich, Stephen. ―Russia and the Global Economic Crisis.‖ Council on Foreign Relations. 
November 25, 2008.  
 
Shchedrov, Oleg. ―Russian infighting could hurt ruling tandem.‖ Reuters. February 20, 2009. 
 
Shvetsova, Lilia. Putin’s Russia. (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Insitution Press, 2003). 
 
Sidorov, Dmitri. ―Russia Should Open to Foreign Investment.‖ Forbes. March 12, 2009.  
 
Simes, Dmitri. ―Uncertainty in Moscow.‖ The National Interest Online: Subjective Evaluation. December 
12, 2008.  
 
Smolchenko, Anna. ―Old Faces Follow Putin to New Jobs.‖ The Moscow Times. May 13, 2008.  
 
Smolchenko, Anna. ―Russia in no rush for crisis summit.‖ The Moscow Times. October 20, 2008. 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
97 
 
Smolchenko, Anna. ―Shuvalov Says No Need to Fear State.‖ The Moscow Times. October 28, 2008. 
 
Speech by Alexei Kudrin. ―Russian Economic Policy and the Global Financial Crisis.‖ Peterson Institute 
of International Economics. April 24, 2009.  
 
Stack, Graham. ―The Kremlin, Decorporated.‖ Russia Profile. August 26, 2009. 
 
Starodubtsev, Andrei. ―Crisis and Discontent in Russia‘s Regions.‖ openDemocracy Russia. February 11, 
2009. 
Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn. ―Russia and the Global Financial Crisis: the End of ―Putinism?‖ Brown Journal 
of World Affairs, Vol. 15 Issue 2. Spring 2009. P 103-115. 
Stott, Michael. ―Russian tanks crush hopes of Moscow liberal agenda.‖ Reuters. August 22, 2008. 
―The restructuring of Rusal: Saving the oligarchs.‖ The Economist. December 5, 2009. 
 
Transcript of Vladimir Putin‘s meeting with Igor Shuvalov and Alexander Zhukov to discuss the work of 
the Governmental Commission on Sustainable Development of the Russian Economy. December 20, 
2008.  
 
Travin, Dmitri. ―Russia: Lurching Between Two Crises.‖ openDemocracy. January 23, 2009.  
 
Vinhas de Souza, Lúcio. ―Effects of financial and economic instability in Russia.‖ Pan-European 
Institute, Baltic Rim Economies Bi-Monthly Review. February 2009. 
 
Volkov, Vadim.―Will the Financial Crisis Lead to Political Change in Russia?‖ PONARS Eurasia Policy 
Memo No. 81. Eurasian Strategy Project, Walsh School of Foreign Service, September 2009. 
 
Wagystl, Stefan. ―Currency Dispute Exposes Moscow Rift.‖ The Financial Times. February 17, 2009. 
 
Walters, Greg. ―Russian Oil Output Falls for Ninth Straight Month.‖ Bloomberg. October 2, 2008. 
 
What Russia has to learn from the crisis: Macroeconomic policy. Sberbank Center for Macroeconomic 
Research. November 27, 2009. 
 
Whitmore, Brian. ―As Crisis Deepens, Russian Finance Ministry Battles 'Siloviki'.‖ Rado Free Europe 
Radio Liberty. February 23, 2009. 
 
Williams, Stuart. ―Russian economy hitting dead end.‖ The Associated Foreign Press. August 11, 2009.  
 
Williams, Stuart. ―Kremlin body proposes radical makeover for Russia.‖ Associated Foreign Press. 
February 3, 2010. 
 
Williamson, John (Ed.). ―The political economy of policy reform.‖ Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, January 1994. 
 
Wilson, Andew. ―Russia‘s economic crisis – no cue for ‗Perestroika 2.0.‘‖ openDemorcracy Online. 
September 4, 2009. 
 
Xiaokun, Li. ―China, Russia sign energy accords.‖ China Daily. April 22, 2009. 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010 
Dasha Barannik, College ‗10,  
 
98 
 
Yakovlev, Andrei, Yuri Simachev, and Yuri Danilov. ―The Russian Corporation: Patterns of Behavior 
During the Crisis.‖ Centre for Comparative Economics. UCL School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies. October 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
